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ABSTRACT 
Narrative Comprehension for Functional Survival Spatial Relations 
by  
Paul James Schroeder, III 
Dr. David E. Copeland, Examination Committee Chair 
Assistant Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Spatial situation models are mental representations of the relationship between characters 
and objects in the narrative environment. Functional spatial relationships describe an 
interaction (or potential interaction) between characters and objects in the narrative 
environment. Although functional relations tend to produce stronger representations as 
compared with nonfunctional ones (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000), recent data also 
suggest that specification of causal information, specifically, survival-based scenarios in 
which characters are described as in immediate danger, may contribute to the 
construction and maintenance of spatial situation models (Jahn, 2004). For the current 
study, this idea was tested by comparing reading times and comprehension for narrative 
texts that describe characters in either dangerous or neutral scenarios who are interacting 
with objects in either a functional or nonfunctional manner. Although faster reading times 
and better recognition scores were observed for the functional critical sentences as 
compared with nonfunctional critical sentences, dangerous/survival scenarios did not 
enhance memory, but actually led to poorer memory. These results suggest that readers’ 
ability to comprehend spatial relationships depend more on the functionality of the 
objects in the narrative environment than the survival status of the character, but that 
iv 
survival does contribute to readers subsequent memorial reconstruction of details 
described in the text.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to thank the following individuals for their time, guidance and support: 
David E. Copeland, Ph.D. (committee chair), Mark H. Ashcraft, Ph.D., Alice J. Corkill, 
Ph.D., Joel E. Snyder, Ph.D. (committee members), Laurel M. Pritchard, Ph.D. 
(Qualifying Paper committee member), and the graduate students and undergraduate 
research assistants of the UNLV Reasoning and Memory Laboratory.  
 
I would also like to express my eternal gratitude to Jessica A. Kruse, M.F.A. and the 
Schroeder and Kruse families for their love and encouragement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER 1     INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 
CHAPTER 2     REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ................................................ 3 
Text Comprehension ....................................................................................................... 3 
The Event-Indexing Model and Situation Dimensions ................................................... 7 
The protagonist ............................................................................................................... 7 
Goals/intentionality ....................................................................................................... 10 
Time .............................................................................................................................. 13 
Causation....................................................................................................................... 17 
Space ............................................................................................................................. 21 
Functionality ................................................................................................................. 32 
Summary of Literature Review ..................................................................................... 37 
The current study .......................................................................................................... 38 
CHAPTER 3     METHODOLOGY ................................................................................. 42 
Participants .................................................................................................................... 42 
Materials ....................................................................................................................... 42 
Stories ........................................................................................................................... 42 
Story ratings .................................................................................................................. 43 
Forced choice recognition test ...................................................................................... 46 
Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 47 
CHAPTER 4     FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ................................................................ 49 
Recognition ................................................................................................................... 49 
Reading time ................................................................................................................. 50 
CHAPTER 5     SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECCOMENDATIONS .......... 52 
Limitations and future directions .................................................................................. 56 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 57 
APPENDIX I     STORIES USED IN THE EXPERIMENT ........................................... 59 
vii 
APPENDIX II    RECOGNITION ITEMS ....................................................................... 69 
APPENDIX III   PREDICTED READING TIME OUTCOMES .................................... 72 
APPENDIX IV   PREDICTED RECOGNITION OUTCOMES ..................................... 74 
APPENDIX V    STORY ACCEPTABILITY JUDGMENTS ......................................... 78 
APPENDIX VI   RECOGNITION OUTCOME TABLE................................................. 81 
APPENDIX VII  RECOGNITION OUTCOME FIGURES ............................................ 82 
APPENDIX VIII READING TIME OUTCOME TABLE .............................................. 84 
APPENDIX IX    READING TIME OUTCOME FIGURES .......................................... 85 
APPENDIX X     IRB APPROVAL FORM ..................................................................... 88 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 92 
VITA ............................................................................................................................... 111 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
viii 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1     Story readability judgements. .......................................................................... 78 
Table 2     Means and standard errors for the critical spatial relations sentence   
acceptability judgments and ratings. ............................................................... 79 
Table 3     Sentence acceptability judgments. ................................................................... 80 
Table 4     Means and standard errors for recognition scores. .......................................... 81 
Table 5     Means and standard errors for critical sentence reading times. ....................... 84 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1     Possible reading time outcome where effects of survival and functionality are   
additive. ........................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 2     Possible reading time outcome where reading times are faster if sentences are 
either survival or functional (or both). ............................................................ 73 
Figure 3     Possible reading time outcome if survival drives the functionality effect. .... 73 
Figure 4     Possible reading time outcome where reading times are faster if sentences are 
functional. ....................................................................................................... 74 
Figure 5     Possible accuracy outcome if effects of survival and functionality are 
additive. ........................................................................................................... 75 
Figure 6     Possible accuracy outcome if high accuracy requires situation to either be 
survival or functional (or both). ...................................................................... 76 
Figure 7     Possible accuracy outcome if Survival drives the Functionality effect. ......... 76 
Figure 8     Possible accuracy outcome if high accuracy requires situation to be functional 
only. ................................................................................................................ 77 
Figure 9     Effect of functionality on recognition scores. ................................................ 82 
Figure 10   Effect of survival on recognition scores. ........................................................ 83 
Figure 11   Interactive effects of functionality and survival on recognition scores. ......... 83 
Figure 12   Effect of functionality on critical sentence reading times. ............................. 85 
Figure 13   Effect of survival on critical sentence reading times. ..................................... 86 
Figure 14   Interactive effects of functionality and survival on critical sentence reading 
times. ............................................................................................................... 87 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Interactions between characters and objects in the environment are better 
comprehended when a functional relationship exists between story entities, as compared 
with nonfunctional relationships (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky, Copeland, 
& Zwaan, 2003). For example, readers better remember that a character was under a 
streetlight on a dark night if she was reading a map, as opposed to if she was trying to get 
out of the rain.  
The present experiment examined comprehension for functional and 
nonfunctional spatial relations when characters were described as being in survival or 
non-survival situations. Participants read twenty original narratives, half containing 
context making the scenario dangerous (i.e., survival condition) and half with a neutral 
scenario (i.e., non-survival condition). Of those scenarios, half of each condition had a 
functional and half had a nonfunctional critical sentence. For example, a character may 
be seeking protection from a predatory animal (survival condition) or taking photos of a 
non-threatening animal (non-survival condition) and is subsequently described as 
standing behind (functional) or in front of a large tree (nonfunctional). In this example, 
standing behind the tree would be functional because the protagonist is either seeking 
protection from a predator (survival scenario) or trying not to startle the harmless animal 
(non-survival scenario). Conversely, standing in front of the tree would be nonfunctional 
because the protagonist would be seen by the predator (survival scenario) or would startle 
the harmless animal (non-survival). Critical sentence reading times were recorded. After 
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reading all of the narratives, participants were then asked to identify the critical 
functional/nonfunctional sentence in a forced-choice recognition paradigm.  
Inclusion of the critical survival context was expected to facilitate readers’ 
attention to the critical functional/nonfunctional relation (Jahn, 2004). More precisely, 
comprehension of functional spatial relations could be enhanced by the presence of a 
threat. Additional support for this prediction comes from recent interest in the “adaptive 
memory hypothesis” (Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nairne, Thompson, & 
Panderirada, 2007), which proposes that the human cognitive system is attuned to 
survival-relevant information. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Text Comprehension 
The construction-integration model of text comprehension (Kintsch & van Dijk, 
1978; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) posits that successful comprehension of narrative text 
requires a series of cognitive operations on the part of the reader. Primary among these 
operations is the act of absorbing the items from the text (i.e., letters, words, sentences, 
and discourse) into the reader’s cognitive architecture. Naturally, these operations depend 
on the presentation modality, be it visual or auditory. Following brief storage in sensory 
memory, the symbolic contents of the text are then passed on to the short-term working 
memory system where they are synthesized into meaningful representations and 
subsequently combined with general world and linguistic knowledge stored in long term 
memory (Erricson & Kintsch, 1995). At a minimum, the culmination of these steps ought 
to result in a coherent semantic or conceptual understanding of what is being read. 
It is generally agreed among psycholinguists that the mental representation of text 
assumes three distinct, but interdependent levels: (1) the surface form, (2) the 
propositional textbase, and (3) the situation model (e.g. van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983). The 
surface form is the most basic level of representation and refers to the text itself, such as 
the sentences, phrases, or words that are used. Conceptual and semantic information 
contribute to the propositional textbase representations. That is, the textbase refers to the 
ideas that are in the text, but not necessarily to the exact words used. Finally, 
representations of the state-of-affairs described in a given text are commonly referred to 
as situation models (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & 
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Radvansky, 1998). Situation models include a combination of what is being described in 
the text as well as what is inferred from the text. On the one hand, situation models of 
narrative text may contain perceptual information, such as images, of scenes described in 
a text. On the other hand, they may represent technical information, for example the 
linguistic and mathematical contents of a word problem (Kintsch & Greeno, 1985). Thus, 
situation models are not static entities; the representation maintained in a situation model 
depends on, among other things, the nature of the text itself.  
According to van Dijk and Kintsch (1983; and summarized in Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998), situation models serve multiple purposes in the reading 
comprehension process. First, situation models help facilitate the incorporation of items 
discussed in a text. This may be accomplished, for instance, by creating tokens of 
characters or spatial locations of events portrayed in a text. Second, situation models may 
be useful in integrating modality-specific information in the cognitive architecture. For 
example, consumers of news information may exploit both textual and pictorial 
accompaniments in a given feature to form a coherent representation of an event. Third, 
greater familiarity with the topic under consideration permits stronger representations 
which ultimately yields faster and greater comprehension. Military personnel would 
likely navigate a field manual with greater dexterity and acumen as compared with a 
civilian simply because the military person possesses familiarity (or prior knowledge) 
with the information in the manual and therefore expends less cognitive effort in 
comprehending the material (assuming that both readers had comparable reading skills). 
Finally, situation models help readers make sense of competing sources of information. 
Suppose two workers are telling their boss about an event that she missed. The boss may 
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use information from both workers to construct one coherent mental representation of the 
event. 
Although the need for situation models is nearly universal in most reading 
contexts, there are occasions when situation models are not required or even necessary, 
such as proofreading. When proofreading, the reader’s goal is not to understand the deep 
meaning of the text; instead, the reader is solely concerned with monitoring surface 
information (i.e., the text itself) for errors, such as misspelled words or poor grammar. 
Because proofreaders do not construct situation models, it can be inferred that the 
construction of one is not necessarily an automatic process. However, it should be noted, 
that under most reading conditions, it is useful to construct a situation model, and hence, 
people do this. 
Zwaan and associates (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998) break down the situation model process into three general steps. First, readers 
create a current model (tn) for a certain clause or sentence (cn).  Second, as the reader 
progresses in the text, new clauses and sentences (c1 through cn) are added to the current 
model which results in the creation of an integrated model (t1 through tn). The transition 
process from the current model to the integrated model is commonly referred to as 
updating (Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Once the reader has reached the conclusion of a 
passage, a complete model (t1 through tx) is created which represents the culmination of 
each current and integrated model. Whereas information pertinent to the current and 
integrated models likely resides in working memory, information comprising the 
complete model is contained in long term memory.  
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As implied earlier, events- particularly singular events - play an important role in 
the construction and maintenance of situation models.  According to Zwaan (1999) the 
interpretation of an event requires the activation of both semantic and episodic 
knowledge. For example, the experience and act of talking may facilitate a reader’s 
ability to follow a story line. This assumption is consistent with van Dijk and Kintsch’s 
(1983) proposal that successful comprehension requires drawing on long term memory 
resources. 
These ideas suggest that comprehension depends on readers’ ability to draw 
inferences and the readers’ knowledge about the world (Haberlandt, 1994).  
Operationally stated, the term inference “refers to information that is activated during 
reading yet not explicitly stated in the text” (Van den Broek, 1994, p.556).  Despite a 
relatively long tradition of research dating back to the work of Bartlett in the 1930’s, 
inferences, what they are and how precisely they may facilitate reading, has been a 
frequent source of controversy among researchers (Van den Broek, 1994; Graesser, 
Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). Guthke (1991; see also Kintsch, 1993) hypothesized that 
inferences draw on information held in long-term memory or on newly acquired 
information and this process may result from either automatic or controlled processing. In 
automatic processing, the reader immediately recognizes an item in a text and links the 
new information with older information in long-term memory. Controlled processing, 
however, occurs when a reader is unable to progress in a text without making an 
inference or when the reader has a special goal to achieve. The reader must, therefore, try 
to access information in memory to make the necessary connection (but see McKoon & 
Ratcliff, 1992). 
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The Event-Indexing Model and Situation Dimensions 
Congruent with the construction-integration theory of text comprehension, Zwaan 
and colleagues have developed the event-indexing-model (Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 
1995; Zwann & Radvansky, 1998) which specifies how situation models are created, 
updated, and used during comprehension. The model proposes that during reading an 
individual may decompose text information into events which are temporarily sustained 
in working memory. Connections between subsequently encountered elements that are 
relevant with the events in working memory are formed and stored in long-term memory. 
Associations between previously and newly encountered text elements span five general 
dimensions (or indices): (1) protagonist, (2) goals/intentions, (3) time, (4) causation, and 
(5) space. Because situation models are based on these dimensions, a discussion of each 
of these factors follows below. The final dimension to be discussed, space, is the focus of 
the current paper. 
The protagonist 
In a typical narrative, the protagonist can essentially be the focus, or like a guide, 
in the development and maintenance of situation models. Indeed, Scott Rich and Taylor 
(2000) argue that characters are critical to maintaining a situation model of narrative text.  
This section contains a description of studies that have examined how readers form a 
coherent representation of a protagonist within the structure of a larger text.  
The situation model perspective concerning the role of the protagonist is largely 
inspired by the work of Sanford and Garrod (1981; see also Garrod & Sanford, 1998). 
The focus model and its related research provides an extensive account of the cognitive 
processes involved in reading and comprehending information pertaining to characters in 
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narrative text. The model assumes, as do theories of discourse comprehension, that 
readers’ ability to comprehend narrative text is constrained by the limited capacity of a 
working memory system and the rules of linguistics. Because stories typically describe an 
evolving series of events, readers are required to retain and combine previously learned 
information with evolving details and events that occur within a story. Concurrently, 
readers must also rely on explicitly stated information about the protagonist to 
comprehend implicitly stated information about other events or characters.  
Therefore, it stands to reason that the main character (or “thematic subject”) in a 
narrative serves as a point of reference for readers to attune their attention. Ancillary or 
secondary characters may also serve as points of reference in a story, but readers are 
typically more concerned with the events occurring to and around the main character. 
Character details, such as when and how a character is introduced in a story (i.e., proper 
name vs. role), can clue readers into the extent of a character’s relevance (Anderson, 
Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Morrow, 1985; Sanford, Moar, & Garrod, 1988). Sanford, 
Moar, and Garrod (1988) tested the effect of proper names (e.g., Mr. Bloggs) versus role 
references (e.g., the manager) in a narrative context. They reported that reading times for 
stories that introduced characters by name was shorter than reading times for stories that 
introduced characters by their roles. This is consistent with the idea that readers have 
primary representations of characters (e.g., based on their names) and that properties 
(e.g., role) are associated with them, but are not the focus in a mental model. These 
results therefore appear to be consistent with the specifications of the focus model 
concerning the importance of proper names in identifying the main character in a story.    
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There is also evidence that people actively monitor the introduction of new 
characters when reading narratives. For example, reading times tend to slow when a new 
character is introduced, suggesting that people are incorporating that new character into 
their situation model (Zwaan, Magliano, & Graesser, 1995). Along this line, the frequent 
recurrence of proper names in narratives, particularly when ancillary characters are 
involved, may also have an inhibitory effect. For example, Gordon and Scearce (1995) 
reported that when participants read short narratives (such as the one below), shorter 
reading times were observed for sentence (1a) if it contained a pronominal referent to the 
preceding sentences, whereas reading times for sentence (1b) were shorter if they 
contained a repeated name. 
Bill wanted John to look over some important papers. 
He had to mail him the documents by Monday. 
(1a) Unfortunately, he/Bill never sent the papers. [continue] 
(1b) Unfortunately, he/John never received the papers. [shift] 
As a result, the whole deal fell behind schedule. 
These findings suggest foremost that readers do indeed monitor and are responsive to the 
introduction of new characters. That is, the presence of a proper name signals that the 
character should be included in the readers’ current situation model. Updating the current 
situation model with new information requires greater processing resources and, as a 
result, slows reading times. Moreover, these results suggest that the assimilation between 
the current and integrated situation models is contingent on both surface and 
propositional details.   
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Investigations of protagonist characteristics have also yielded evidence for 
situation model construction and updating. Some research indicates that readers are 
attentive to changes in a character’s affective state (de Vega, León, & Diáz, 1996; 
Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998; Komeda & Kusumi, 2006). Decelerations in 
participant reading times have been recorded for emotional shifts (Komeda & Kusumi, 
2006) and inconsistencies (de Vega, et al., 1996) during narrative reading. Researchers 
have interpreted these outcomes as suggestive of online updating of situation model 
construction (Komeda & Kusumi, 2006; Zwaan & Radvanky, 1998); specifically, an 
updating of the characteristics of the protagonists.  
In sum, these studies provide evidence suggesting that readers keep track of, and 
recall information about, characters during narrative reading.  This is because readers 
focus their attention on protagonists during narrative reading (Sanford & Garrod, 1981). 
Readers rely on explicitly stated details, such as proper names, to determine a character’s 
relevance to a story (Anderson, Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Morrow, 1985; Sanford, Moar, 
& Garrod, 1988). Finally, the repeated finding that changes in characters’ emotional 
states during narratives elicits changes in participants’ reading times has been interpreted 
as evidence for online situation model maintenance and updating (de Vega, León, & 
Diáz, 1996; Gernsbacher, Hallada, & Robertson, 1998; Komeda & Kusumi, 2006; Zwaan 
& Radvansky, 1998). 
Goals/intentionality 
In Shakespeare’s Hamlet, the protagonist endures a series of trials and 
tribulations, including feigning insanity and serving jail time, in order to accomplish the 
ultimate goal of avenging his father’s murder.  His quest begins when a ghost informs 
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him that his father’s untimely death was perpetrated by his uncle, Claudius. Despite his 
skepticism about the ghost’s advice, he decides to take up the cause. Had the meeting 
between the hero and the ghost not occurred at the outset of the story many of the 
subsequent details would make little sense. For example, because he suspects that his 
uncle is guilty, Hamlet pays close attention to Claudius’s actions during a play depicting 
his father’s death.  In any other context, this behavior might seem unusual. Thus, an 
understanding of the primary character’s motivation is critical for successful 
comprehension.  
This notion is consistent with the constructionist framework of narrative 
comprehension (Graesser, Singer, & Trabsso, 1994). The constructionist perspective 
stipulates that readers actively engage in a search for meaning during reading. More 
specifically, rather than focusing their attention on surface level details (i.e., letters and 
words; the structure of sentences), readers are more concerned with making sense of what 
they are reading. A crucial part of this process includes determining why characters 
behave as they do in a narrative. Characters’ actions are often inspired by accomplishing 
some ultimate (superordinate) goal; but before that goal may be met, the individual may 
have to overcome a series of smaller (subordinate) goals. For example, Hamlet’s 
superordinate goal is to avenge his father’s death; yet, to accomplish this he must 
overcome a sequence of interim obstacles, or subordinate goals, created by Claudius. 
Forming associations between the superordinate goals of characters, subsequent actions, 
and the overall theme of a story requires readers to generate inferences (Graesser, et al., 
1994) because some of the vital information may not be explicitly stated in the text. 
These inferences are likely created during on-line reading (Long, Golding, & Graesser, 
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1992; for an alternative perspective, see McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992), provided that the text 
is coherent and that the reader has followed the story through its natural course. 
Much of the research on the role of intentionality in narrative comprehension has 
focused on the relationship between actions and goals. The accumulated evidence 
suggests that readers create a mental checklist of goal-relevant story details. Goals that 
have been satisfied are essentially checked-off and mentally discarded, whereas 
unsatisfied goals remain prominent in memory. Character actions are therefore evaluated 
in terms of their relevance to the most pressing goal. Suh and Trabasso (1993, see also 
Trabasso & Suh, 1993) used verbal protocols and text probes to measure participants’ 
comprehension of stories in which primary and secondary goals were met or unmet. 
Results from the verbal protocols suggested that participants were more focused on 
unsatisfied subgoals, as compared with unsatisfied superordinate goals. Analysis of 
reading times for the probes indicated that participants read information about unsatisfied 
goals faster than probes for satisfied goals.  
Explanations for why unsatisfied goal information is more accessible to readers 
than satisfied goal information has eluded researchers; yet the effect has been replicated 
on numerous occasions (i.e., Lutz & Radvansky, 1997; Magliano & Radvansky, 2001; 
Radvansky & Curiel, 1998; Richards & Singer, 2001). One possibility is that the level of 
agreement between goals and actions may have some effect on comprehension (Egidi & 
Gerrig, 2006; Huitema, Dopkins, Klin, & Meyers 1993). Huitema, et al (1993) found that 
reading times for stories vary as a function of consistency between goals and actions.  
Uncompleted goals can be a potential motivator of actions, whereas completed goals 
cannot (provided that the completion does not yield a new uncompleted goal) (Suh & 
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Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993). This is because readers of narratives understand 
that characters actions are typically inspired by a quest to accomplish some goal. 
Therefore, comprehension is best achieved when there is congruency between events that 
occur within a narrative and the motivations of the character. That is, characters actions 
are causally relevant to the characters goals (Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985).  
In conclusion, information about goals is important for narrative comprehension 
because readers make sense of events that transpire during the course of a narrative by 
following the goals of the characters (Graesser, Singer, & Trabsso, 1994) whether they 
are superordinate or subordinate goals. When a text fails to clarify the relationship 
between a characters’ described behavior and the meeting of a goal, readers generate 
inferences (Graesser, et al., 1994). When there is strong agreement between characters’ 
actions and goals, readers are better able to comprehend what they are reading (Egidi & 
Gerrig, 2006; Huitema, Dopkins, Klin, & Meyers 1993). Finally, goals-in-progress are 
more easily activated than unmet goals, possibly because unmet goals provide motivation 
for a character’s actions (Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Trabasso & Suh, 1993).  
Time 
Of critical importance to the successful comprehension of narrative texts is the 
reader’s ability to follow the duration of an unfolding sequence of events (Anderson, 
Garrod, & Sanford, 1983; Mandler, 1984; Ohtsuka & Brewer, 1992). Studies have shown 
that common linguistic devices, such as verb tense (was, will, am), time adverbs (i.e. 
before, after, now), and verb aspect (ate, was eating) function as temporal markers to 
signal the order in which events occur (Carreiras, Carriedo, Alonso, & Fernández, 1997; 
Magliano & Schleich, 2000, Zwaan, 1996). Readers rely on these textual cues, in addition 
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to general world knowledge, to form a coherent mental representation of what is being 
described in the text, but are limited by the amount of information they are able to 
process and store in working memory (Magliano & Schleich, 2000; Ohtsuka & Brewer, 
1992). 
Occasionally, the temporal order of events may not be specified in a given text, as 
demonstrated in the following sentence: 
  (2) Riley went to the kitchen, picked up the pineapple, and grabbed a knife. 
When a narrative text fails to explicitly state the order of events via tense or adverbs, 
readers take for granted that the narrated sequence (i.e. Riley first went to the kitchen/ 
picked up the pineapple when he got there/ then grabbed the knife) is the correct order of 
events. The iconicity assumption (Fleischman, 1990; Hopper, 1979) states that, in the 
absence of clear temporal guidelines, readers generally assume that the order in which 
events in a story are told denotes the correct chronological order. 
Dowty (1986; see also Zwaan, 1996) proposed an extended version of the 
iconicity assumption, the so-called “strong iconicity assumption” (or temporal discourse 
interpretation principle), which specifies that, in addition to relying on the order in which 
events are relayed in a story, extended time lapses within the duration of a narrative may 
prompt readers to create a new situation model. For example, narratives can include 
sudden leaps in time, flashbacks, or flashforwards, which could disrupt comprehension. 
Zwaan, Magliano, and Graesser (1995) reported that increases in sentence reading times 
were observed when readers encountered temporal discontinuities in narratives, 
regardless of whether readers were engaged in natural reading or reading for memory. 
Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, and Curiel (1998) also found the same effect for temporal 
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discontinuities when stories were presented clause-by-clause, rather than sentence-by-
sentence, as in Zwaan, et al’s (1995) study. In addition, using an event related potential 
(ERP) method, Ditman, Holcomb, and Kuperberg (2008) showed that noticeable N400 (a 
negative electric brainwave that occurs 400 milliseconds after the presentation of a 
stimulus)  patterns occurred when readers encountered large, unexpected time shifts, as 
compared with short or moderate time shifts. The N400 pattern suggests that readers 
spent more time reading the longer narrative time shifts and, thus, integrating the 
information into their situation model.  
Additional empirical support for the strong iconicity assumption comes from 
Zwaan (1996). Participants were exposed to short narratives in which the critical 
sentences featured either close (i.e., a moment later), intermediate (i.e., an hour later), or 
distant (i.e., a day later) temporal adverbials. Consistent with the strong iconicity 
assumption, shorter reading times and response latencies were found for stories in which 
there was a shorter time shift (i.e., a moment later). It appears as though larger time shifts 
(i.e., a day later) suggest to readers that they should construct a new situation model 
because the narrative is likely to now be describing a new state-of-affairs. That is, this 
suggests that temporal discontinuities in the story timeline may interfere with the normal 
maintenance of a prior situation model. When a reader encounters a narrative time shift, 
information that was read prior to the shift may become less accessible because it is part 
of the earlier situation model, while newer information becomes more prominent in 
memory, because it is part of the current situation model (Speer & Zacks, 2005). 
Radvansky, Zwaan, Federico, and Franklin (1998) extended the findings of 
Zwaan (1996) by demonstrating that, regardless of whether the necessary temporal 
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linguistic information (i.e., temporal adverbials, verb tense) is available from a text, when 
readers encounter inconsistent information, the current situation model may become 
discarded for a new one to complete the integrated model. For instance, provided that a 
character is not a two-headed, four-limbed being, most readers would immediately 
recognize the physical impossibility of an average human character simultaneously 
playing pinball, reading a novel, and playing piano.  If one were to have read these facts 
during the course of a normal narrative, the conflicting new information would likely 
disrupt the normal updating process and interfere with any associated recall activity. 
However, if the text specifies that a character contemplated reading a novel while they 
were playing pinball or thought about playing a piano while they were reading but did 
not actually perform these activities simultaneously (as indicated by the requisite 
adverbials), then normal comprehension would not be disrupted (de Vega, Robertson, 
Glenberg, Kaschak, & Rinck, 2004). 
The use of other inconsistency paradigms has also revealed evidence that readers 
use temporal information to update their situation model. One approach has been to 
manipulate temporal information so that it is inconsistent with subsequent information 
(Rink, Gámez, Diáz, & de Vega, 2003; Rink, Hähnel, & Becker, 2001). Another 
approach has been to manipulate temporal information in such a way that it violates 
readers’ expectations. Therriault and Raney (2007) compared reading times for narratives 
comprised of events that occurred over normal or incongruent temporal durations. For 
example, in one passage two characters met at a restaurant and dined together for either 
one-hour (normal duration), seven hours (long-inconsistent duration), or five minutes 
(short-inconsistent duration). As with other inconsistency studies, the manipulation had a 
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significant effect on reading times.  In general, the detection of these inconsistencies 
shows that people actively monitor temporal information (Therriault & Raney, 2007).  
Together, these studies show that temporal situation models depend on 
comprehension of text-level input as well as inferences derived from the readers’ world 
knowledge. Specificity about the duration of events that occur during the course of a 
narrative facilitates comprehension, whereas textural inconsistencies and sudden time 
shifts may disrupt comprehension (Zwaan, et al., 1995; Zwaan, et al., 1998). When the 
duration of events is not specified in the text, readers defer to the narrated sequence, as 
described by the iconicity assumption (Dowty, 1986; Fleischman, 1990; Hopper, 1979; 
Zwaan, 1996).  
Causation 
A cohesive narrative must account for why characters behave in a described 
manner or why certain events happen so that a person can comprehend what they are 
reading. Comprehending causal relations requires both textual cues as well as inferences 
derived from the reader’s world knowledge.  The following section provides a bottom-up 
description of how readers create causal representations of narratives. First, consideration 
will be given to how the integration of sentence-level information, including the use of 
specific grammatical devices (connectives), forms a basic causal description of the text. 
A brief discussion will follow on the role of inferences derived from the text and world 
knowledge in generating higher-level representations of a narrative. The section will 
conclude with a short discussion about theories of higher-level representations of causal 
coherence.  
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Inspired by the work of Haliday and Hasan (1976), researchers began to explore 
how text-based cues (such as conjunctions) help readers comprehend narrative relations.  
Conjunctives (connectives) are grammatical devices (words, phrases) used to specify 
conceptually associated statements or clauses in text.  There are four major types of 
conjunctions: (1) additive (and, also), (2) adversative (however, but), (3) causal (as a 
result, because), and (4) temporal (after, then).  It is generally agreed among researchers 
that, because they reduce the linguistic ambiguity between clauses or statements in a text 
and therefore the need for inferences, connectives are helpful for reading comprehension 
(Haliday & Hasan, 1976; Haviland & Clark, 1974; Keenan & Kintsch, 1974; Lorch, 
1989).  
There are several lines of evidence suggestive of the facilitative effect of 
connectives, more specifically causal connectives, on reading comprehension. First, 
faster reading times have been observed for sentences containing causal connectives as 
compared with no connectives (Haberlant, 1982; Millis & Just, 1994), additive 
connectives (Sanders, 1992; Sanders & Noordman; 1998), temporal connectives (Singer, 
Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992), and diagnostic sentences (Traxler, Bybee, & 
Pickering, 1997). It has also been demonstrated that the presence of causal connectives 
promoted superior performance on other cognitive activities such as recall (Caron, 
Micko, & Thüring, 1988; Golding, Millis, Hauselt, & Sego, 1995; Millis, Golding, & 
Barker, 1995; Millis & Just, 1994; Sanders, 1992; Sanders & Noordman, 1998), 
verification latencies (Cozijn, 1992; Sanders, 1992; Sanders & Noordman, 1998); and 
probe response times (Cozijn, 1992; Millis & Just, 1994; Singer, et al., 1992).  
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Some scientists contend that causal connectives facilitate comprehension by 
enabling readers to make connections between sentence-level clauses. Millis and Just 
(1994) proposed a connective integration model of text processing, which stipulates that 
readers create separate representations for two clauses, each of which is held briefly in a 
limited capacity working memory system and subsequently combined when the end of a 
sentence is reached.  For example, when readers encounter a sentence like “The elderly 
parents toasted their only daughter at the party because Jill had passed the exams at the 
prestigious university” a representation is created for the first clause in working memory, 
while the connective (because) signals the creation of an additional representation for the 
second clause. Upon reaching the end of the sentence, a unified, integrated representation 
is then created for both clauses and the reader is thus able to understand how these two 
pieces of information go together. Data from eye-tracking studies suggests that clause 
integration may occur prior to sentence wrap-up (Traxler, Bybee, & Pickering, 1997). 
In addition to text-level information, people also rely on world knowledge to 
determine causal relations during reading. Investigations into the role of world 
knowledge in comprehension have been conducted by examining participants’ abilities to 
generate inferences for causal information (Zwaan & Singer, 2003). For example, Black 
and Bern (1981) presented short stories to participants in which the first sentence was 
either causally or temporally related to the next sentence. In the following example, 
readers must infer that the protagonist is sad (4) either because he lost his pocketknife 
(3a) or for some reason not specified in the text (3b). 
(3a) Causal: While he was sitting on a huge log he lost an old pocketknife. 
(3b) Temporal: While he was sitting on a huge log he found an old pocketknife. 
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(4) He felt sad as they took a few more pictures and headed back. 
Results from both cued and free recall tests indicated that causally related stories were 
better recalled than temporally related stories. Thus, when an explicit expression of the 
causal relation between story elements is available to readers, comprehension improves.    
One explanation for this finding is that in the absence of an explicit causal 
description, readers use bridging inferences to make associations between sentences 
(Singer, Halldorson, Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; Singer, Revlin, & Halldorson, 1990). 
Bridging inferences require that readers validate a given premise (i.e., Dorothy poured 
water on the fire. The fire went out.) with their knowledge of the world (i.e., water 
extinguishes fire). As the distance between idea units increases (i.e., Dorothy poured 
gasoline on the fire. The fire went out.), the greater the strain on working memory 
resources and, consequently, comprehension becomes disrupted (Singer, Halldorson, 
Lear, & Andrusiak, 1992; Zwaan & Singer, 2003). 
Text-level comprehension and inferences generated from world knowledge 
ultimately aid in the creation of a cohesive representation of a narrative.  Theoretical 
accounts of the nature of these representations derive largely from the constructionist 
tradition, which holds that readers are actively engaged in a “search for meaning” during 
reading and that attentive readers are motivated to understand what they are reading 
(Graesser, Singer, & Trabsso, 1994).  Network models of reading, such as those 
developed by Trabasso and colleagues (Trabasso, Secco, & van den Broek, 1984; 
Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & Suh, 1993; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985) are 
useful in helping researchers illustrate how readers mentally represent causal relations.  
Fundamentally, the model developed by Trabasso and colleagues specifies that the goals 
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of the protagonist generate a sequence of causally related events (a “causal chain”) that 
occur throughout the course of a story. The strength of the connections between events 
facilitates or inhibits the readers understanding of the narrative. As such, deviations from 
the specified goals of the protagonist will disrupt the formation of a coherent causal 
representation of the story. Evidence obtained from recall measures suggests that stories 
with strong causal chains were better recalled than stories with weak causal chains 
(Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985).   
In sum, the formation of a causal situation model of a narrative requires both 
lower- and higher- level processing. At the lower level, readers must form coherent 
sentence level representations. Sentence representations are facilitated by textual cues, 
namely, causal connectives (Haliday and Hasan, 1976), and depend critically on the 
availability and amount of information that can be stored in working memory (Millis & 
Just, 1994). Texts that specify causal relationships are better remembered than texts that 
require the readers to generate bridging inferences (Singer, et al., 1992; Singer, et al. 
1990). Textual information, inferences, and world knowledge contribute to the 
maintenance and updating of higher-level causal representations (Trabasso, et al., 1984; 
Trabasso & Sperry, 1985; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985).  
Space 
Thus far, this paper has presented a survey of four of the five dimensions central 
to situation model construction and maintenance: the protagonist, goals/intentionality, 
time, and causality. The spatial dimension is the primary focus of the study. This section 
will first consider research related to the spatial framework and will then examine spatial 
relations.  
22 
Space is one of the most widely researched dimensions of situation models 
(Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Efforts to understand spatial situation models have 
generally sought to determine how readers use spatial situation models and how they 
might interact with other situational variables. For example, one area of interest is how 
readers monitor the movements and actions of the protagonist in certain environments.  
Here, consideration will be given to evidence for the organization and monitoring of 
spatial information and how readers continuously update this information into a coherent 
situation model.   
The idea that people use space as a foundation for their mental models was 
demonstrated by Radvansky and colleagues (Gerard, Zacks, Hasher, & Radvansky, 1991; 
Radvansky, 1999a; Radvansky, Spieler, & Zacks, 1993; Radvansky & Zacks, 1991; 
Radvansky, Zacks, & Hasher, 1996) in that they showed that readers organize spatial 
information by creating single or multiple spatial situation models from textual content. 
In these studies participants read sentences that described randomly paired objects and 
locations, or characters and locations. A typical set of sentences might be: 
(5) The cola machine is in the hotel.      The cola machine is in the public library. 
(6) The cola machine is in the high school. 
(7) The display case is in the city hall. 
(8) The potted palm is in the city hall. 
(9) The broken window is in the city hall. 
Thus, in this example one object (the cola machine) is described as being in three 
spatially distinct locations (the hotel, the public library, and the school). These sentences 
also describe a single location (city hall) that contains multiple objects (the display case, 
23 
potted palm, and broken window). The primary findings for these studies were that 
participants exhibited better recall for information about multiple objects in a single 
location. For example, the participants appeared to integrate that the city hall contained 
the display case, potted palm, and the broken window better than the fact that the cola 
machine was located in the hotel, the public library, and the high school. The latter 
finding is commonly referred to as the fan effect. One explanation for these outcomes is 
that the logical impossibility of a single object being simultaneously present in three 
different locations disrupted comprehension or caused processing difficulties. However, 
the situation model perspective for these findings is that readers create an integrated 
spatio-temporal representation for related pieces of information and separate 
representations for unrelated pieces of information. In other words, people seemed to be 
building situation models centered around spatial locations. By merging related 
information (i.e., common location) into a unified representation, readers were better able 
to access pertinent information and suppress irrelevant information during recall 
(Radvansky, 1999b; for an alternative memory-based perspective, see Anderson & Reder, 
1999). 
While spatial location seems to be a primary basis of organizing information, 
sometimes this is not a realistic option. For example, it is possible for a spatial location to 
be too small to realistically contain multiple objects or people (e.g., a witness stand in 
court or a bathroom on a Greyhound bus). Radvansky, Spieler, and Zacks (1993) showed 
that when spatial organization is not plausible, people will sometimes organize around a 
protagonist. That is, in this scenario readers exhibited better recall for information about a 
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single character in multiple locations. However, this does seem to be an exception to the 
typical pattern of organizing around spatial locations. 
The above point is important because even though people typically organize 
situation models around spatial locations, spatial and entity information can interact. For 
example, readers seem to monitor protagonists as they move through various locations. 
As discussed previously, readers are sensitive to narrative details about a protagonist, 
sometimes even taking the protagonist’s point of view in a story (Bower, 1975; Black, 
Turner, & Bower, 1979; Bower & Morrow, 1990). Following the movements and 
locations of the protagonist creates what Morrow (1994, 1995) has termed a “Here-and-
Now” perspective (or the deictic center, Segal & Duchan, 1997). Textural cues, such as 
prepositions (e.g., The fireman walked down the street) or verb aspect (walk/walked) help 
readers determine a character’s present location in a narrative (Bower & Morrow, 1990; 
Morrow, 1985; Morrow & Greenspan, 1988). Moreover, it has been shown that readers 
keep track of and are attentive to inconsistencies in a protagonist’s location (Black, 
Turner, & Bower, 1979), regardless of whether this information is explicitly or implicitly 
described in the text (Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1989; Morrow, Greenspan, & 
Bower, 1987).  
Perhaps one of the more intriguing findings from spatial narrative research is the 
effect of varying described distances between characters, locations, and important objects 
on comprehension. The map-and-narrative task originally developed by Morrow and 
colleagues (Morrow, Bower, & Greenspan, 1989; Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987), 
and subsequently modified by Rinck and Bower (1995), requires that participants first 
memorize a map of a fictional building with many rooms and to then read a narrative that 
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describes a character’s movement within the building and interactions with available 
objects (Rinck, 2005; Rinck & Bower, 1995). These narratives detail a room-by-room 
account of the character’s movement through the building, and occasionally, as people 
are reading, they are probed with items that vary as to how close they are to the 
character’s current location (e.g., same room, previous room, distant room). In general, 
longer reading and response times are observed as the distance between the protagonist 
and target items increases. This phenomenon is known as the gradient of spatial 
accessibility (Rinck & Bower, 1995). This suggests that readers mentally move through 
the spatial locations along with the character (but see Pylyshyn, 1981 for an alternative 
view of visual imagery). 
While there are some circumstances when the gradient of spatial accessibility is 
not observed, such as when the spatial layout of the building changes during the narrative 
(Wolf, Hasebrook, & Rinck, 1999) or when the characters movements are non-
unidirectional (Rapp, Klug, & Taylor, 2006), the gradient of spatial accessibility is a 
rather robust finding and has been observed under many experimental conditions. For 
example, a gradient of spatial accessibility has been found regardless of variations in the 
described environment (Rinck, Williams, Bower, & Becker, 1996), direction of spatial 
distance (Rinck et al., 1996), language of the narrative (Rinck et al., 1996), targeted probe 
items (Rinck et al., 1996), the size of the rooms of the building (Rinck, Hähnel, Bower, & 
Glowalla, 1997), and whether or not the location room is explicitly stated (Rinck, Bower, 
& Wolf, 1998). In addition, some evidence indicates parallel increases in reading and 
response times for the spatial accessibility and other situational dimensions, such as 
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protagonist goals (Bower & Rinck, 1999; Rinck & Bower, 2004) and time (Rinck & 
Bower, 2000), suggesting an interactive effect.  
Evidence for the effects of distances on spatial situation models are not 
necessarily task-specific and have also been observed in situations where the participants 
were not required to memorize a map of a location prior to narrative reading. In a classic 
study, Glenberg, Meyer, and Lindem (1987) had participants read short narratives in 
which an item was described as proximally near or distant to the protagonist. For 
example,  
(10) John was preparing for a marathon in August.  
(11a) (near) After doing a few warm-up exercises, he put on his sweatshirt and 
went jogging. 
(11b) (distant) After doing a few warm-up exercises, he took off his sweatshirt 
and went jogging. 
Note that in one sentence the protagonist distances himself from an object (e.g., the 
sweatshirt) by taking it off and in the other sentence a close spatial relationship is formed 
with the object when it is put on. Response times for probed items were faster if the item 
was described as being proximal to the protagonist, as compared with items that were 
distant from the protagonist. These results support the idea that spatial distances are 
important to situation models of narratives because readers clearly update information 
about spatial relations by monitoring the actions of the protagonist. This finding, that 
readers are sensitive to the described spatial distance between important objects and 
characters, has come to be called the spatial distance effect. 
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Spatial distance effects have been observed in non-narrative contexts as well. In a 
similar study that used a virtual environment instead of a narrative, Radvansky and 
Copeland (2006) reported that participants demonstrated better on-line recall for recently 
acquired items as compared with discarded items while navigating through a virtual 
environment. Importantly, memory for these items was most affected by a change in 
spatial location. That is, when there was not a change in location, objects were more 
accessible in memory than when there was a change in location. In two other studies, 
Copeland, Magliano, and Radvansky (2006; see also Magliano, Radvansky, & Copeland, 
2007) reported that participants’ success in a video game was related to both the spatial 
proximity between the player, allies, and enemies, as well as recent changes in spatial 
location. Thus, these studies support the narrative studies that show that people are 
affected by changes in spatial location.  
The spatial framework theory (Franklin & Tversky, 1990) specifies that readers 
rely on their interactions and perceptual experiences with the world to comprehend 
spatial information. More specifically, representations of the location of (and relationship 
between) objects described in a narrative are interpreted relative to three asymmetric axes 
of the human body: a vertical axis corresponding to the head/feet and two vertical axes 
corresponding to the front/back and left/right perspectives. Knowledge about the 
fundamental laws of gravity also governs the construction of a mental representation, 
particularly with regard to objects that require the vertical (head/feet) perceptual senses. 
Work in this domain has repeatedly shown that objects requiring head/feet 
representations are most accessible, front/back are moderately accessible, and left/right 
are least accessible (Bryant & Tversky, 1992; Bryant, Tversky, & Franklin, 1992; 
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Franklin & Tversky, 1990). The explanation for these findings is that people assemble a 
mental representation of the spatial environment and important objects in the 
environment are matched to the relevant axis of the body (head and feet, front and back, 
and left and right).  
Although researchers have been successful at isolating some of the relevant 
properties associated with spatial situation models, efforts to obtain evidence for space, as 
an independent dimension, has been met with mixed results. Reading times for situational 
inconsistencies in narratives has been the hallmark metric for testing a dimension’s 
unique contribution to reading comprehension. To date, reports of longer reading times 
for spatially inconsistent narratives have emerged (O’Brien & Albrecht, 1992; de Vega, 
1995; Haenggi, Gernsbacher, & Bolliger, 1994; Rinck & Hähnel, 2000), suggesting that 
readers do indeed monitor spatial information during reading. Given these findings, one 
would therefore expect that readers might observe other types of situational anomalies 
during the course of narrative reading. 
Zwaan, Magliano, and Graesser (1995) had participants read narratives in which a 
character was described as being in a spatially continuous or a spatially distinct location 
(a spatial discontinuity). Although this manipulation produced longer second pass reading 
times, it had little to no effect on initial sentence reading times. This outcome was 
particularly striking, given that longer initial reading times were observed for temporal 
and causal discontinuities. Zwaan, Radvansky, Hilliard, and Curiel (1998) reported 
similar outcomes for sentence- and clause- reading times for situational discontinuities. 
Thus, while readers do appear to monitor spatial inconsistencies, they do not always 
show evidence of monitoring spatial discontinuities.   
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One explanation for these incongruent outcomes is that task instructions may have 
had an effect on participants’ performance. In fact, Zwaan and colleagues have 
investigated this possibility (Zwaan & van Oostendorp, 1993; Zwaan, et al., 1995; 
Zwaan, et al, 1998). Participants in these experiments were instructed to either read 
normally or read for memory. This manipulation had little informative effect on reading 
times, but did produce small group differences, to the extent that those instructed to read 
for memory had longer times as compared with those instructed to read naturally. In 
addition, a recent study by Radvansky and Copeland (2010) has suggested the possibility 
that reading time effects may not always be observed because spatial updating may be 
easier than other, less natural types of updating, such as changes in time. As it stands, 
spatial situation model construction appears to be an integral component of the normal 
reading process.   
Another possibility why researchers report contrasting outcomes for studies 
examining space as a situation model dimension may have more to do with the text used 
in the studies. Texts that focus readers’ attention on spatial information are more likely to 
produce effects consistent with the situation model perspective, as compared with texts 
that focus the readers attention on other, or even multiple, situational dimensions 
(Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Rinck, 2005; Zwaan & van Oostendorp, 1993). Early 
investigations into readers’ memory for spatial information provide some evidence for 
this hypothesis.  
Consider a well-known study conducted by Bransford, Barclay, and Franks 
(1972). For their experiment, participants listened to sets of sentences describing varying 
spatial arrangements, such as  
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(12a) Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them. 
  (13a) Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam beneath them. 
Note the difference in the spatial layout (on vs. beside). In sentence (12a), the referent is 
the turtles that are resting on the log, whereas in sentence (13a) the referent is the turtles 
that are resting beside the log. In both sentences, the fish is described as swimming 
beneath the turtles, but the fish is only swimming beneath the log in the first sentence. 
After the participants heard the sentence, they were administered a recognition task that 
included the same, as well as subtly altered constructions of the sentences, such as  
(12b) Three turtles rested on a floating log, and a fish swam beneath it. 
(13b) Three turtles rested beside a floating log, and a fish swam beneath it.  
In these constructions, the pronominal referents are identical with respect to the original 
sentences, but the spatial layouts have changed, such that in both cases, the fish is 
described as swimming beneath the log. To reiterate, in (12a) and (12b) the fish is 
swimming beneath both the turtles and log. However, in (13a) the fish is swimming 
beneath only the turtles, while in (13b) the fish is beneath only the log. 
The outcomes from this study were clear: readers do not simply create surface-
level representations for text, even when they are instructed to do so; rather they form a 
higher-level representation of the described spatial situation. The results from the 
recognition tests indicated a consistent pattern: participants often confused sentences such 
as (12a) and (12b), yet rarely confused sentences such as (13a) and (13b). Again, the 
wording difference between (12a) and (12b) was the same as between (13a) and (13b); 
the difference, however, was that the former referred to the same spatial situation and 
were confusable and the latter referred to different spatial situations and were not 
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confused. Thus, when a given text focuses readers’ attention on spatial information, 
evidence for situational representations are more likely to be observed, as compared with 
texts that prompt the activation of multiple situations models.  
In a similar experiment, Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) had participants read 
short determinate and indeterminate descriptions of a spatial arrangement. A determinate 
description precisely described the physical locations of the items (e.g., A is behind D. A 
is to the left of B. C is to the right of B.) 
(14) A B C 
  D 
Indeterminate descriptions permitted alternative arrangement possibilities (e.g., A is 
behind D. A is to the left of B. C is to the right of A.). 
(15a) A B C  (15b) A C B 
  D     D 
  After reading the descriptions, the participants were then presented with a 
diagram of the spatial arrangement, for which they were instructed to decide if the 
diagram was consistent or inconsistent with the text description. Finally, they completed 
an unexpected memory test. Results from the recall task suggested that people created a 
situation model for determinate descriptions, but a text-based representation for 
indeterminate descriptions. In other words, they remembered the gist of the determinate 
descriptions because those descriptions permitted only one spatial arrangement whereas 
the indeterminate descriptions, where it was unclear which of the possible spatial mental 
model arrangements was intended, people relied on their memory of the text.  
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In conclusion, readers form situation models for spatial information. Studies of 
the fan effect (Radvansky, et al., 1991; Radvansky, et al., 1993) show that readers 
organize information and create situation models based on spatial locations. They 
combine related pieces of information to form unified representations and create multiple 
representations for unrelated pieces of information. Readers also monitor spatial shifts in 
narratives and update their situation model accordingly (Morrow & Greenspan, 1988; 
Morrow, 1990; Morrow, 1985). Successful integration of spatial information depends on 
the described distances between characters and locations, as indicated by the gradient of 
spatial accessibility (Rinck & Bower, 1995) or the described distances between characters 
as objects, as indicated by spatial distance effects (Glenberg, et al., 1997).  Finally, 
evidence for spatial situation models is strongest when other spatial descriptions are most 
salient and other situational dimensions are not required for comprehension (Bransford, 
Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982). 
Functionality 
The creation of a coherent spatial situation model may be facilitated by the 
relationship between items in a described spatial array.  Spatial relations may be 
expressed in different ways: (1) lexically (i.e. prepositions such as over, in, above, 
below), (2) in property (e.g., shoe and laces: laces are used to fasten the shoe to the foot), 
or (3) orientation (e.g., floor and bookshelf: the floor supports the bookshelf). Related 
items are assimilated in the current situation model more easily than items that are not 
related (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). Work in the spatial cognition domain has 
demonstrated that the more closely associated items are, the easier it is to retrieve items 
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from memory when required to do so, regardless of symmetry (Coventry, Venn, Smith, & 
Morely, 2003).  
Theorists have speculated that how readers perceive the interactions between 
items, as well as how these items might be used, is also critical to understanding how 
spatial relations are comprehended (Coventry, 1997; Coventry & Garrod, 2004; Garrod & 
Sanford, 1989; Michotte, 1963; Vandelosie, 1984; 1991). For example, if one were 
presented with a cap and a tube of toothpaste, one might observe that both objects are 
related in property and in purpose (the cap is used to keep the toothpaste inside the tube).  
Of course, knowledge about the world is required to make the inference that the cap and 
tube are purposefully related. Stated differently then, it could be proposed that the cap 
and tube of toothpaste are functionally related. That is, the cap functions to preserve the 
toothpaste contained in the tube. 
In a demonstration of the effect of functionality on spatial relatedness, Carlson-
Radvansky, Covey, and Lattanzi (1999) had participants place pictures of located objects 
(e.g., a tube of toothpaste v. a tube of oil paint) above or below a referenced object (e.g., 
a toothbrush). Presenting the referenced items as aligned or misaligned with their 
respective center mass permitted a direct test of the importance of functionality on spatial 
relations. The key idea was that placement tended to be further from the center of mass 
for the referenced item when there was a functional spatial relation present. In the 
example, because toothpaste is applied to the bristles of a toothbrush, people located 
“above” to be closer to the end with the bristles. However, for the paint, “above” was 
closer to the physical center of the toothbrush. In short, participants naturally perceived 
the spatial relations between objects in terms of functionality, even when they were not 
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prompted to do so. These findings support the notion that functional relatedness is central 
to processing spatial relations. 
As another example, suppose a man was standing below an old bridge. While 
there is nothing inherently functional about a man standing below a bridge, the 
appropriate context can lead to a functional spatial relationship between story elements. 
Here, the old bridge can provide the protagonist with shelter from rain. However, if the 
circumstances were changed- if a sudden downpour of rain was not mentioned in the text- 
then the fact that the protagonist was standing under the old bridge would seem hardly 
relevant to the reader. For example, if instead the protagonist were attempting to read a 
map on a dark, moonless night, the old bridge would be of little functional significance to 
the protagonist, as compared with other objects in the environment, such as a streetlight.  
Using narratives with spatial relations similar to the aforementioned one, 
researchers (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky, Copeland, & Zwaan, 2003) 
explored the effect of narrative context and functional spatial relations on readers’ recall 
and recognition of story events. The results from these experiments indicated that stories 
that specified functional spatial relationships were better comprehended than stories that 
specified nonfunctional spatial relationships. Moreover, reading times for the critical 
sentences, as well as recall and recognition scores were superior for functional, as 
compared with nonfunctional spatial relations. That these findings were due not simply to 
differences in lower-levels of discourse representation (i.e., surface or textbase 
representations), as reported by Radvansky et al. (2003), only furthers the argument that 
functional spatial relations facilitate the construction of integrated situation models.  
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Jahn (2004) argued that causal descriptions in narratives also contribute to the 
comprehension of spatial relations. In his view, meaningful interactions between 
characters promote stronger representations of spatial relations. Consider the following 
example taken from Jahn (2004). 
(16)    Two Zebras graze next to a shrub and an antelope trots towards them. 
In this example, the object (the shrub) serves as a reference point for the spatial array 
(e.g. the zebras are already spatially proximal to the shrub, but the antelope is not). 
Importantly, there is no meaningful relationship between the zebras and the antelope. One 
might expect that little interaction would occur between the zebras and the antelope save 
for perhaps a brief visual acknowledgement. Now consider a different scenario from Jahn 
(2004): 
(17)  Two zebras graze next to a shrub and a lion trots towards them. 
Here, the spatial arrangement of objects and characters is identical to sentence (16), but, 
in contrast, the reader is likely to anticipate a meaningful interaction between the 
characters. That is, one assumes that the lion is described as moving towards the zebras, 
not to feed from the shrub, but rather to satisfy its predatory intentions towards the 
zebras. According to Jahn (2004), the lion’s intention to attack the zebras suggests a 
causal relationship. In other words, the lion is trotting towards the zebras because it 
intends to attack. Therefore, functional relations in narrative spatial descriptions are 
necessary, but not sufficient to promote spatial representations. The causal agent in 
narratives is the focus of the readers’ attention, rather than the functional relations 
between objects and characters. Consequently, the causal component of the narrative 
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increases the likelihood of the spatial relation being encoded into the situation model 
representation.  
Indeed, Jahn (2004) reported that participants were better at discriminating similar 
recognition sentences from different recognition sentences when the sentences described 
predator-prey relations (e.g., the zebras and the lions), as compared with sentences that 
described allied relations (e.g., the zebras and the antelope). As further evidence for the 
effect of causal relations on spatial representations, additional experiments were 
conducted in which participants were instructed to determine (yes/no) whether a threat 
was present in the description. The rationale for this manipulation was to ensure that 
participants observed the spatial relations and inferred the causal relations between the 
characters. Again, the danger manipulation had a significant effect on recognition scores 
and improved recognition scores for peaceful descriptions. Thus, when participants were 
instructed to observe spatial and causal relations, performance improved.  
Jahn’s (2004) findings raise a number of interesting points beyond the earlier 
ideas of functionality and causality improving memory for spatial relations (i.e., the 
causal-functional hypothesis). That readers appear to retain information of a survival 
flavor better than neutral stimuli is consistent with a developing body of work (e.g., 
Nairne, Pandeirada, & Thompson, 2008; Nairne, Thompson, & Panderirada, 2007; 
Weinstein, Bugg, & Roediger, 2008). Proponents of the “adaptive memory hypothesis” 
(Nairne, et al., 2008) propose that the human cognitive system is attuned to survival-
relevant information. Work in this domain consists primarily of priming research 
participants to imagine themselves in particular situations (e.g., stranded in the grasslands 
in need of food and water) and to then rate a set of given words on their relevance to the 
37 
situation. After rating the words and completing a distracter task, participants are then 
given a surprise recall test. Outcomes from these studies have evidenced a fairly 
consistent pattern in support of the adaptive memory perspective: participants who were 
primed to imagine themselves in a survival scenario generally exhibit better recall for 
words than those in the competing conditions. Thus, it seems there is a memory benefit to 
associating information with survival / danger situations. That is, regardless of whether 
participants are more focused on survival information or if the survival information may 
promote arousal, there appears to be a clear memory benefit. However, currently it is not 
clear whether survival / danger contexts improve memory for spatial relations above and 
beyond simple functional relations.   
Summary of Literature Review 
  The current state of research on how people read and understand narrative text 
suggests a complex interaction between both low- and high-level cognitive systems, 
namely perceptual encoding, working memory, and long-term memory. The collective 
efforts of these resources culminate in the formation of three interdependent levels of 
mental representation for discourse: (1) the surface form, (2) propositional textbase, and 
(3) situation model (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998). Situation models are mental representations of the state of affairs 
described in a text and are thought to be defined by five narrative dimensions (or 
indices): (1) the protagonist, (2) goals/intentionality, (3) time, (4) causation, and (5) space 
(Zwaan, et al. 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Spatial situation models are mental 
representation of the narrative environment and how characters interact in the 
environment.  Radvansky and colleagues (2000; 2003) showed that relationships that are 
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functionally congruent are often better understood as compared with relationships that are 
functionally incongruent or nonfunctional.  However, Jahn (2004) suggested that 
functional spatial relations also require specification of causal information.  According to 
this perspective, causal relations are most salient when a character is facing an imminent 
threat.  These findings appear to be consistent with a developing body of work on the 
adaptive memory hypothesis (e.g., Nairne, et al., 2007; 2008; Weinstein, et al., 2008), 
which postulates that the human cognitive system is sensitive to survival-relevant 
information. 
The current study  
The objective of the current experiment was to determine whether survival-based 
scenarios (as expressed in narratives that describe characters in life-threatening 
situations) contribute to the development and maintenance of situation models for 
functional spatial relations.  More specifically, the focus of the current investigation was 
to determine whether, as Jahn (2004) suggested, causal factors inherent in survival/non-
survival narratives focus readers’ attention on functional/non-functional spatial relations. 
This study will expand on Jahn’s (2004) and Radvansky and Copeland’s (2000) studies 
by comparing the unique effects of survival context and functionality, as well as their 
interaction. 
Participants read twenty short, original narratives that include two types of critical 
sentences that each can be in one of two conditions (yielding a total of four 
combinations): (1) survival or non-survival sentences in which the character’s life may or 
may not be at risk and (2) functional or nonfunctional sentences that describe a 
contextually useful or contextually non useful relationship with an item in the spatial 
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environment (all stories are listed in the Appendix). To reduce the likelihood that 
participants would detect the purpose of the study, 16 non-experimental filler stories that 
did not include survival/non-survival or functional/nonfunctional critical sentences were 
also presented. Also, to ensure that participants were reading for comprehension, two 
comprehension questions were answered after reading each narrative. This data was only 
used to exclude participants who scored below a score of 75% (i.e., participants who did 
not take the task seriously). Reading times for the functional/nonfunctional sentences 
were recorded. After reading all of the narratives, participants then responded to forced 
choice recognition questions for the critical sentences. 
Four potential outcome patterns were considered for the critical sentence reading 
times. One possibility was that both survival and functionality would equally contribute 
to story reading times (Figure 1, Appendix). In this scenario, the fastest reading times 
would likely be observed for the survival-functional stories because both components, the 
survival aspect and the functional aspect, contribute to ease of processing. In other words, 
the effects of survival and functional contexts are additive here and there would not be an 
interaction. This outcome would be consistent with the faster reading times observed for 
functional sentences reported by Radvansky and Copeland (2000) and faster reading 
times for survival sentences reported by Jahn (2004). Accordingly, this outcome pattern 
would suggest that functional-survival relations should be more easily integrated into a 
reader’s situation model. A second possibility is that survival and functional content 
would have equal effects on reading times (Figure 2, Appendix). Here it would be 
expected that the presence of either survival or functional content would be enough to 
speed up processing (i.e., faster reading times). Here there would be an interaction 
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because reading times would be fast if either survival or functional content was present 
(or both), but not for non-survival nonfunctional content. A third possibility is that 
survival relations would drive the overall reading time effect (Figure 3, Appendix).  In 
this scenario, it is not the functionality that leads to faster processing, but only the 
survival content. However, based on the work by Radvansky and Copeland (2000) where 
effects of functionality were observed, this outcome seems unlikely.  Finally, a fourth 
possibility is that functional relations would drive the overall reading time effect (Figure 
4, Appendix).  For this outcome, it is not the survival content that leads to faster 
processing time, only the functional relations.  
As with the predictions for the critical sentence reading time outcomes, four 
potential outcome patterns were considered for the recognition scores. One possibility is 
that both survival and functionality status would contribute additively to recognition 
scores. Evidence for this outcome would be indicated by a non-interactive effect for both 
conditions, with the best memory performance for content that was in the survival- 
functional condition (Figure 4, Appendix).  This outcome would suggest that both 
survival and functional content are strongly integrated into the readers complete situation 
model. A second possibility is that survival status, functionality, or both, would equally 
affect recognition (Figure 5, Appendix). This outcome suggests that improved 
recognition memory is strongly affected by the presence of either survival or functional 
relations (or both). A third possibility is that only survival content would affect 
recognition memory performance (Figure 6, Appendix). As with the reading times, this 
outcome seems to be the least likely (see Radvansky & Copeland, 2000).   Finally, a 
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fourth potential outcome is that only functionality would affect recognition scores.  This 
outcome would be consistent with work by Radvansky & Copeland (2000). 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
A total of 40 undergraduate men and women (ages 18-30 years) were recruited from the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas psychology subject pool and were awarded class credit 
for their participation. Although there were no restrictions on the ethnic backgrounds of 
the recruited participants, some exclusionary criteria were implemented for the current 
experiment (e.g., only native English-speaking participants were permitted to participate).  
Materials 
Stories 
Twenty original experimental and 16 filler stories were created for the 
experiment. The stories were loosely based on those used by Jahn (2004) and Radvansky 
and colleagues (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky et al., 2003). All 20 
experimental narratives are available in the Appendix. The experimental stories were 
constructed so that each contained one critical sentence that conveyed a threat to the 
protagonist for the survival version of the stories, but a non-threat for the non-survival 
version of the stories. For example, in the example story from the Appendix, for the first 
critical sentence the non-survival version is “As he reached, he knocked over a container 
of water.”  In contrast, the survival version is “As he reached, he knocked over a large jug 
of rat poison.” Clearly, the latter sentence is more critical toward the character’s survival 
because rat poison is more likely to kill a person. 
 In addition, the stories contained one critical sentence that conveyed a functional 
spatial relation when a character interacts with an object in one way, but a nonfunctional 
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relation when the object was interacted with in another way.  For example, in the 
example story from the Appendix, the character either holds the plastic tarp above him 
(functional condition) or holds the plastic tarp next to him (nonfunctional condition). 
Here, the functional relation in the survival version of the story is that the protagonist can 
use an object in the environment (the plastic tarp) to protect himself from a danger, 
whereas in the non-survival version the plastic tarp serves as a way to keep from getting 
wet. Regardless of the survival condition, holding the tarp next to him does not serve a 
function. 
To counterbalance the incidence of functional, nonfunctional, survival, and non-
survival sentences, there were four versions of each story. Each participant read five 
stories containing a functional survival scenario, five stories containing a functional non-
survival scenario, five stories containing a nonfunctional survival scenario, and five 
stories containing a nonfunctional, non-survival scenario. Across all stories, for a given 
reader, each condition occurred equally often at each position. All four text versions were 
rotated across participants. The stories were 15 sentences long, with the survival and 
functional critical sentences at approximately one third and two thirds of the way through 
each story, respectively. Each version of the critical sentences was matched for number 
of syllables. Included within the main experimental trials were 16 filler stories.  In 
addition, there were two practice stories to familiarize people with the procedure; the 
practice stories were also filler stories.  
Story ratings 
A separate cohort of participants (n = 24) that did not complete the main 
experiment were asked to judged if the stories were equally readable (i.e., participants 
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were asked to rate how well the story flowed and made sense). Mean ratings for the four 
versions of the stories were as follows (see also, Table 1 in the appendix): survival-
functional (M = 5.34, SE = .08), survival-nonfunctional (M = 5.19, SE = .10), non-
survival-functional (M = 5.24, SE = .11), and non-survival-nonfunctional (M = 5.15, SE = 
.08). A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the ratings 
for the four story conditions. Ratings for the survival and non-survival stories did not 
differ significantly, F (1, 19) = 1.09, p > .311. Ratings for the functional and 
nonfunctional conditions also did not differ significantly, F (1, 19) = 1.30, p > .269. 
Finally, there was no significant interaction between ratings for the survival and 
functional stories, F (1, 19) = .13, p > .719. Thus, the four versions of the stories were all 
rated similarly.  
Stories were rated on danger and functionality by yet another separate cohort of 
participants (n = 10) that did not complete the main experiment. These participants read 
and rated versions of the experimental stories that contained either a critical sentence that 
described characters in a survival condition (i.e., danger was present) or a critical 
sentence that described characters in a non-survival condition (i.e., danger was not 
present). Presentation order (survival, non-survival) was counterbalanced. After reading 
each story, participants’ were then asked to rate the level of danger described in the story 
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 = no danger present and 7 = extremely dangerous.  
Overall, the stories that described a survival situation (M = 4.94, SE = .19) were clearly 
rated as more dangerous than the stories that described a non-survival situation (M = 
2.69, SE = .19), t (9) = 8.02, p < .001.  
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In addition to the danger rating task, participants were also asked to determine, 
from a given set of options, whether each sentence could complete the critical spatial 
relation (i.e., whether it was plausible that the sentence could be in that story) and to then 
rate the sentence options as to how well they fit. The critical sentence describing the 
spatial relation was omitted from the story (i.e., there was a gap where that critical 
sentence would appear in the story). Participants were asked to decide (yes/no) if four 
potential sentences could possibly fit with the story. In addition, the participants were 
also asked to rate how well each sentence choice fit with the story. The potential 
sentences that were assessed for acceptability and rated for fit included: (1) the critical 
sentence describing a functional spatial relation, (2) the critical sentence describing a 
nonfunctional spatial relation, (3) a distracter sentence describing a functional spatial 
relation with an object that was not mentioned in the story, and (4) a distracter sentence 
describing a nonfunctional spatial relation with an object that was not mentioned in the 
story. Ratings for each answer choice were entered on a Likert-type scale where 1= poor 
fit and 7 = good fit.   
Mean sentence acceptability judgments are listed in Table 2 (Appendix). Sentence 
fit judgments (yes/no) for the functional, nonfunctional, and distracter critical sentences 
differed significantly from one another, χ2 (5) = 34.93, p < .001. Pair wise comparisons of 
the judgments for each of the four sentence conditions (survival-functional, survival-
nonfunctional, non-survival-functional, and non-survival-nonfunctional) as well as the 
two distracter sentences were conducted using a Wilcoxon signed ranks test. As can be 
seen from Table 3 (Appendix), although ratings for the four sentence conditions differed 
significantly from ratings for the distracter sentences (all significance values were less 
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than .01), ratings for each of the four critical sentence conditions (i.e., the non-distracter 
sentences) did not differ significantly (all significance values were greater than.05).  
Mean fit ratings for the critical spatial relation sentences are available from Table 
2 (Appendix). Overall, the functional critical sentences were rated as having a better fit 
with the stories as compared with the nonfunctional sentences, F (1, 9) = 234.29, p < 
.001.  In addition, both functional and nonfunctional critical sentences were rated as 
being a better fit with the stories as compared with the distracter sentences, F (1, 9) = 
3.89, p < .001.  Thus, while both the functional and nonfunctional sentences were 
acceptable in the stories, the functional sentences were rated as a better fit with the 
narrative context (i.e., a better fit with the causal structure).   
Forced choice recognition test 
One forced-choice recognition question was created for each story based on the 
functional critical sentences (see Appendix). For each question, four choices were 
available to the participant: (1) the functional critical sentence, (2) the nonfunctional 
critical sentence, (3) the functional relation with a wrong object, and (4) the 
nonfunctional relation with a wrong object.  For example, in the first story in the 
Appendix, the forced-choice recognition question was: “Which of the following 
sentences appeared in the story? (1) Earl was holding the plastic tarp above him, (2) Earl 
was holding the plastic tarp next to him, (3)Earl was holding the newspaper above him, 
(4) Earl was holding the newspaper next to him.” The order of the choices was 
randomized for each question. 
Finally, two comprehension questions were created for each story.  The questions 
were used to ensure that people had read the stories for comprehension. For the sample 
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story, the questions were “Did Earl mop the floor?” and “Were there boxes in the storage 
room?” Overall, half of the questions were true and half were not.  None of the questions 
asked about information in the critical sentences. 
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually.  The texts were presented on a PC -
compatible computer.  The text was white on a black background in 40-column mode. 
People read the two practice stories first, followed by the experimental and filler texts.  
The practice stories were always filler stories and never included functional or survival 
relations. The stories were read in a different random order for each person.  Reading was 
self-paced; the texts were presented one sentence at a time.  Each of the critical items was 
a single sentence.  After reading a sentence, the subject pressed the space bar and the next 
sentence appeared.  The computer recorded reading times.  After each story two 
comprehension questions were presented in red font.  Participants were instructed to 
answer by clicking one of the two buttons on the mouse with the right hand.  The left 
mouse button was pressed for “yes, this is true”, and the right mouse button for “no, this 
is false”.  There was an equal number of “yes” and “no” answers.  
After reading all of the stories, participants were presented with the forced-choice 
recognition test. Participants’ entered their responses by selecting the appropriately 
labeled numerical key on the keyboard (1, 2, 3, or 4). Thus, participants read all of the 
stories, including the filler stories, before beginning the recognition test. Recognition 
items were presented in a random order for each participant, and the question for each 
story (with the four corresponding options) was presented by itself on the computer 
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screen. Immediately after entering their response for an item, the computer presented the 
next question with its choices. There were no recognition questions for the filler stories.  
.   
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
 The analyses were based on manipulations of functionality and survival.  Thus, 
the experiment was a 2 (condition: survival vs. non-survival) x 2 (condition: functional 
vs. nonfunctional) design. Both reading time and recognition accuracy were the 
dependent measures 
 Outliers were dealt with using a procedure described by Van Selst and Jolicoeur 
(1994).  Briefly, this procedure involves calculating a standard deviation criterion cut-off 
value that is based on the sample size. Although a cutoff score of 75% accuracy for the 
comprehension questions was set for inclusion in the analyses, all participants scored 
above the criterion (M = .87, SD = .08), so none of the participants’ scores were removed 
from the analyses described below.   
Recognition 
Critical sentence recognition scores were submitted to a 2 (functionality) x 2 
(survival) repeated measures ANOVA for both a subject and item analysis. For all 
results, the subscript 1 denotes a subject analysis and the subscript 2 denotes an item 
analysis. The main effect of functionality was significant for the subject analysis, F1 
(1,39) = 21.07, p < .001, ηp2 = .35, and marginally significant for the item analysis, F2 
(1,19)=3.78, p = .07, ηp2 = .16, with people accurately recognizing more of the functional 
than the nonfunctional spatial items.. There was also a main effect of survival, which was 
significant for the subject analysis, F1 (1, 39) = 4.29, p = .045, ηp2= .099, and marginally 
significant for the item analysis, F2 (1,19)=3.29, p = .09, ηp2 = .15. Recognition was better 
for non-survival than survival stories. Finally, the two-way interaction between survival 
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and functionality was not significant, F1 (1,39) = 1.48, p = .231, ηp2 = .04,  F2 (1,19)=.73, 
p = .40, ηp2 = .04. As can be seen from Table 3, the effect of functionality appears to be 
pretty clear. Performance was high for the functional sentences for both the survival and 
non-survival conditions, and these two conditions did not differ from each other, F1 
(1,39) = .438., p = .51, ηp2 = .011, F2 (1,19) = .15, p = .71, ηp2 = .008.  While the 
nonfunctional items were remembered more poorly, this seemed to be the case 
particularly for the survival condition, which had the lowest recognition percentage. 
Indeed, recall for nonfunctional critical sentences was marginally better under non-
survival conditions, as compared with survival conditions, F1 (1,39) = 3.77, p = .06, ηp2 = 
.088, F2 (1,19) = 3.28, p = .09, ηp2 =.147. Figures 9, 10, and 11 (Appendix) illustrate 
outcomes for the recognition data. 
Reading time 
As with the critical sentence recognition items, reading times were submitted to a 
2 (functionality) x 2 (survival) repeated measures ANOVA based on both subjects and 
items. As with the recognition data, the main effect of functionality was significant, F1 
(1,39) = 4.03, p = .052, ηp2 = .094, F2 (1,19)=7.08, p = .02, ηp2 = .27, with faster overall 
reading times for the functional critical sentences. However, in contrast to the recognition 
data, the main effect of survival was not significant, F1 (1,39) = .142, p = .71, ηp2 = .004, 
F2 (1,19)= .06, p = .81, ηp2 = .003.  Nevertheless, although the majority of the variance in 
critical sentence reading times was explained by the effect of functionality, survival may 
have contributed some variance as well, as indicated in the significant two-way 
interaction between functionality and survival, F1 (1,39) = 6.90, p = .012, ηp2 = .15, F2 
(1,19) =5.24, p = .034, ηp2 = .22. 
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Follow-up tests (see Table 4) showed that although reading times for the 
functional critical sentences did not differ between survival conditions, F1(1,39) = 1.90, p 
= .176, ηp2 = .046, F2 = 1.90, p = .184, ηp2 = .091 slower reading times were observed for 
the nonfunctional sentences under the survival condition, relative to those in the non-
survival condition, F(1,39) = 3.55, p = .067, ηp2 =.08, F2 = 1.89, p = .185, ηp2 = .090 
although it was only marginally significant. Figures 12, 13, and 14 (Appendix) illustrate 
outcomes for the reading time data. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECCOMENDATIONS 
The results of the present experiment suggest that narrative comprehension of 
spatial relationships between characters and objects in an environment depends more on 
the functionality of the object (Radvansky & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky et al., 2003), 
than the causal reasons underlying the spatial relationship (Jahn, 2004). Here, the overall 
effect of functionality emerged from readers’ comprehension, regardless of survival 
status. In fact, survival status did not seem to enhance memory of the functional 
information, as evidenced by the similar means for the functional information from both 
the survival and non-survival versions of the stories.  
This was surprising because it was predicted that the survival context would 
enhance readers’ memories of the story information. First, Jahn (2004) reported that 
people were better at recognizing sentences that described characters in dangerous 
scenarios (e.g., a lion stalking a zebra), as compared with sentences that described 
characters in neutral scenarios (e.g., a zebra near an antelope). Second, a more recent, 
related body of work by Nairne and colleagues (Nairne, et al. 2008; 2007) showed that 
people are better at remembering information learned in a survival context (e.g., stranded 
in the grasslands needing food and water) as compared with memory for information 
learned in a neutral context (e.g., on vacation). Thus, despite the availability of evidence 
favoring the notion of superior memory for survival-relevant information, the results of 
the present experiment do not appear to neatly conform to those previous findings.    
Nevertheless, survival context does seem to have some type of effect on memory 
and comprehension First, it seems likely that the functional sentences were likely to have 
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been integrated into the situation model while reading. These reading times were faster, 
suggesting that they were more easily processed by readers. In contrast, the reading times 
for the nonfunctional sentences, particularly in the survival condition, were quite long. 
This suggests that the nonfunctional information in the survival condition was not 
expected when it was encountered, and was thus not easily integrated into the situation 
model (hence the longer times). This conclusion parallels a body of work by O’Brien and 
colleagues, who reported longer reading times for sentences in stories that included 
inconsistent information about the location of a protagonist (Hakala & O’Brien, 1995; 
Myers, O’Brien, Albrecht, & Mason, 1994; O’Brien & Albrecht, 1992), as well as 
research on the processing of other situation model dimensions, such as time (Rink, 
Gámez, Diáz, & de Vega, 2003; Rink, Hähnel, & Becker, 2001). Accordingly, because it 
was less likely to be integrated into the situation model, memory for these nonfunctional 
relations was worse at recognition, particularly in this survival–nonfunctional condition. 
It may be that people are not as likely to encode the nonfunctional information into the 
situation model in this survival condition, and as a consequence, during recognition 
people may reconstruct (e.g., Bartlett, 1932) the spatial relations to fit the survival 
motivation, and subsequently mistakenly pick the functional sentence.  
Note that this outcome cannot be explained as an artifact of the story content or 
unusualness of the nonfunctional information (e.g., the von Restorff effect) because that 
unusualness would produce better memory for that information, when in fact, memory for 
nonfunctional information was worse. Also, recall that the critical functional sentences 
for all stories were rated by an independent sample of participants.  Importantly, 
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participants rated the both the functional and nonfunctional sentences as acceptable fits 
with the story, as compared with distracter sentences.   
At the outset of the current experiment, four possible outcomes were predicted for 
the critical sentence reading times and four possible outcomes were predicted for forced-
choice recognition items. Consistent with Radvansky and Copeland (2000) (and Figure 4, 
Appendix), regardless of survival condition, faster critical sentence reading times were 
observed for the functional sentences, relative to the nonfunctional sentences. 
Nevertheless, contrary to expectations, slower reading times were observed for the 
nonfunctional sentences in the survival condition. This outcome suggests that 
participants’ integration of that story content into a coherent situation model was quite 
difficult. In general, better recognition scores for the functional items, relative to the non-
functional items (Figure 11, Appendix), are also consistent with Radvansky and 
Copeland (2000). However, weaker recognition scores for the survival-nonfunctional 
content, relative to the non-survival-nonfunctional content, was unexpected.  
The outcomes for the current experiment compliment the existing literature on 
functional spatial relationships. Radvansky and Copeland (2000) suggested two general 
requirements for the construction of a functional spatial situation model. First, for a 
functional relation to exist, the state of one character must (or could) be affected by their 
interaction with another story element (be that an object or character). Second, the 
interaction must be important to the reader. However, the value of the described 
interaction is left to the discretion of the reader; some interactions may be judged as more 
vital than others. Consistent with this perspective, both Radvansky and Copeland (2000) 
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and Radvansky et al. (2003) found that functional spatial relations were read faster and 
better remembered than nonfunctional spatial relations.  
Subsequently, Jahn (2004) argued that causality (in the form of survival 
situations) was a necessary prerequisite for the spontaneous construction of situation 
models for spatial relations because readers would be more motivated to focus on the 
spatial relation if danger was present. This notion was largely inspired by Bransford, 
Barcley and Franks’ (1972) study in that some of their materials included predatory 
animals interacting with non-predatory animals in the sentence stimuli. Indeed, Jahn 
(2004) found that participants’ sentence recognition was stronger for survival scenarios 
as compared with non-survival scenarios. Perhaps serendipitously, this report 
foreshadowed more recent efforts by Nairne and colleagues (Nairne et al., 2007; Nairne 
et al., 2008), which showed that people are better at remembering words that are relevant 
to survival scenarios, as compared with neutral scenarios.   
 While the present study is consistent with work by Radvansky and Copeland 
(2000; Radvansky et al., 2003), in that functional spatial relations were read faster and 
recognized better than nonfunctional spatial relations, they are inconsistent with ideas 
from Jahn (2004) and Nairne et al. (2007). That is, survival content had little to no effect 
on critical sentence reading time or memory for story content. Hence, as long as the 
information conveys a functional relation, readers spontaneously construct situation 
models for spatial relations while reading and do not appear to rely on additional causal 
information (in this case, a dangerous scenario) specified in the narrative context in order 
to do so. However, they may rely on elements of the story content to reconstruct their 
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situation model during recognition, but this stipulation does not diminish the implications 
of the reading time outcomes observed for the present experiment.  
Limitations and future directions 
If human memory is specially tuned to survival relevant information (Nairne et 
al., 2007; Nairne et al., 2008) then why was the present sample of readers as good at 
recognizing functional sentences in a non-survival context as compared with functional 
sentences read under survival contexts?  Consider the characteristics of a typical adaptive 
memory experiment: participants are told to imagine themselves as stranded in the 
grasslands, rate a list of words on their relevancy to the scenario, and are then given a 
surprise memory test for the words after completing a distracter task. First, whereas 
previous adaptive memory studies (e.g., Nairne, et al., 2007) focused on the grasslands as 
a setting, stories used in the present experiment described characters in a multitude of 
environments and situations (e.g., a worker in a messy closet). Also, both survival and 
non-survival situations were described in grasslands settings. It may be possible that there 
is something special about the grassland environment that affects memory; this point may 
require further examination. Second, in contrast to stimuli used by Jahn (2004), 
immediate threats (such as an approaching hungry lion) were not specified for all of the 
story stimuli used in the current study. In the present experiment some dangers could be 
considered less imminent. For example, in the example story the worker in the messy 
closet could have avoided the dripping poison by simply waiting, rather than using the 
tarp. Thus, even though the stories in the current study were all rated as dangerous, there 
might be a difference between general and immediate danger.  Third, memory benefits 
from survival scenarios may not have been observed in the current study because the 
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survival scenario was set up by manipulating a single sentence in the story. It is possible 
that this small manipulation was not strong enough to clearly convey the danger. 
However, this possibility seems less likely because the stories were rated as clearly more 
dangerous in the survival condition. Regardless, future research efforts may benefit from 
lengthening the stories or adding additional sentences to emphasize the danger level of 
the narratives.  
 Additional methodological distinctions between the current and typical adaptive 
memory experiments also merit further consideration. For example, in contrast to the 
typical second-person scenarios used in the adaptive memory studies (i.e., the word 
“you” is used to refer to the participants themselves), stories in the present experiment 
were written in the third-person (e.g., he or she). Hence, comparisons could be made for 
second- vs. third-person perspective recognition (e.g., Copeland & Houska, 2010). Also, 
recent evidence suggests that the future temporal perspective, in contrast to the past or 
present, enhances survival-based memory (Klein, Robertson, & Denton, 2010). The 
stories used in the current study were all framed in the past tense, or possibly interpreted 
as the present tense; however, they clearly were not in a future perspective. It is possible 
that stories written in future-oriented perspective may be more likely to show effects of 
survival. 
Conclusion 
Comprehension of narrative discourse requires readers to generate situation 
models of the state of affairs described in a text (Johnson-Laird, 1983; van Dijk & 
Kintsch, 1983; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). Situation models include representations of 
protagonists, goals/intentionality, time, causation, and space (Zwann & Radvansky, 1998; 
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Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995). Past research has shown that situation models for 
functional spatial relations between characters and objects in the environment are more 
easily processed and better remembered than nonfunctional spatial relationships 
(Radvanksy & Copeland, 2000; Radvansky et al., 2003). The goal of the present 
investigation was to determine if causality (as expressed in survival narrative scenarios) 
is a necessary prerequisite for successful comprehension of functional spatial relations, as 
suggested by Jahn (2004).   
Consistent with the results obtained by Radvansky and Copeland (2000; 
Radvansky et al., 2003), outcomes for the present study suggest that readers are better at 
comprehending functional spatial relations as compared with nonfunctional spatial 
relations. However, inconsistent with Jahn’s (2004) findings, danger/survival context did 
not enhance memory for spatial relations. In fact, there was superior recall for 
nonfunctional sentences that were associated with non-survival than survival context.   
Along this line, at first glance, the results of the present study seem to be incompatible 
with the adaptive memory hypothesis endorsed by Nairne and colleagues (Nairne et al., 
2007; Nairne et al., 2008), which poses that human memory is attuned to survival-
relevant information. However, while survival context did not enhance memory for the 
spatial relations, a consideration of both the recognition and reading time results suggest 
that people may have had good memories for the survival context itself.  
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APPENDIX I 
STORIES USED IN THE EXPERIMENT 
Story 1 
Earl was cleaning the old storage room at work. 
It had not been cleaned in a long time. 
The storage room was a huge mess. 
There were boxes everywhere. 
He could hardly walk around. 
He saw an old pile of things up on a shelf that was over the doorway. 
But he had difficulty reaching up to them. 
Plus, there were a bunch of boxes in the way. 
Critical survival sentence: As he reached, he knocked over a large jug of rat poison. 
Critical non-survival sentence: As he reached, he knocked over a container of water. 
It was dripping down right in the doorway - right where he needed to go. 
Earl needed to find something to cover himself from the drips. 
He spotted a plastic tarp he could use. 
Critical functional sentence: Earl was holding the plastic tarp above him. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Earl was holding the plastic tarp next to him. 
He was upset that he got stuck cleaning this storage room. 
He thought that maybe he should ask for a raise. 
Did Earl mop the floor? 
Were there boxes in the storage room? 
 
Story 2 
Kim lay awake in her sleeping bag gazing at the stars.  
She could never see this many stars back home in the city. 
So far she had spotted over ten different constellations. 
The most obvious was the big dipper. 
The night was so clear that she could even spot Venus - it was the brightest object in the 
sky. 
She sighed as she relaxed in her sleeping bag - she had just purchased it for this trip. 
The campfire she built a few hours ago was still burning. 
It produced a lot of light and heat. 
Critical survival sentence: Something bit her arm; she needed to sterilize the wound. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Kim was feeling cold and saw she had goosebumps 
on her arms. 
She could hear the fire crackle. 
She reached out and fumbled for the zipper on her sleeping bag. 
She wiggled out of her sleeping bag and stood up. 
Critical functional sentence: Kim moved and was standing next to the campfire. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Kim moved and was standing far from the 
campfire. 
She thought that she wasn't feeling too well. 
Maybe this trip was a mistake. 
60 
Did Kim look at Jupiter? 
Had Kim eaten marshmallows? 
 
Story 3 
Ted couldn't believe his luck. 
Last night it was rainy when he stumbled upon a small cave. 
The cave was nice because it kept him dry all night. 
Because it had stopped raining today, Ted spent the whole morning hiking. 
In the afternoon, though, the sky became very dark. 
It wasn't long before it began to rain. 
Suddenly the rain started to come down really hard. 
He could feel the wind stinging his face. 
Critical survival sentence: Ted saw a tornado forming in the sky and was scared. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Ted remembered that he had left his raingear in the 
cave. 
He could feel his clothes getting wetter as he weighed his options. 
He quickly decided to retrace his steps and find the cave. 
Luckily he remembered where it was. 
Critical functional sentence: Ted was crouching quietly inside the cave. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Ted was crouching quietly outside the cave. 
The rain continued for another hour. 
By the time it stopped the sun was already setting. 
Did Ted hike all morning? 
Did the sky become dark in the morning? 
 
Story 4 
Izzie loved to go hunting on her family's farm.  
She had been hunting with her dad for as long as she could remember. 
Izzie shot her first gun when she was five years old. 
Someone raised in the city might find that strange, but not out here in the country. 
Since her dad died, though, Izzie would have to go hunting alone. 
After taking some time to grieve, Izzie decided to get back out to the woods. 
This month was deer season and Izzie had her favorite gun with her - she nicknamed it 
Bandit. 
While she was walking she came to abrupt stop. 
Critical survival sentence: Izzie saw a large bobcat and had to protect herself.  
Critical non-survival sentence: Izzie checked her gun and noticed she needed to 
clean it. 
She was standing out in the open. 
She looked around for a better position. 
She knelt down to steady herself. 
Critical functional sentence: Izzie was holding her gun in front of her. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Izzie was holding her gun down at her side. 
She knew that if she took care of her gun it would take care of her. 
Her dad would be proud. 
Was it deer season? 
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Was Izzie 3 years old when she first shot a gun? 
 
Story 5 
Beth was hiking in the outback of Australia. 
She loved the openness of the desert - it gave her a sense of freedom. 
The scenery all around her was simply breathtaking. 
She was a little bit upset that she had forgotten to bring her camera. 
It didn't matter, though, because her mind was taking in a wonderful experience. 
As she walked she saw a tree that had a giant beehive hanging from it. 
She noticed a swarm of bees around the hive. 
For some reason, she thought about her ninth grade science class when she learned bees 
don't like water. 
Critical survival sentence: Suddenly the swarm of bees came toward her and she 
ran. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Having not bathed for days, she wanted to soak in 
water. 
She looked around and saw a river. 
It was about 100 yards away. 
Beth moved straight toward it. 
Critical functional sentence: Beth took a breath as she stood in the water. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Beth took a breath as she stood near the water. 
The water was a greenish-brown color. 
Luckily the current wasn't too strong. 
Was Beth hiking in Africa? 
Was the water blue? 
 
Story 6 
Rick was floating on a raft down the mighty Mississippi River. 
He had just quit his job because of some crazy circumstances. 
His annoying ex-wife was suing him for more child support. 
Because Rick couldn't handle that stress, he decided to run away from his problems. 
Although, in this case, he was floating away on his raft. 
While it wasn't the best raft, so far he was moving along down the water. 
As he drifted he took stock of his current situation. 
He noticed some jagged rocks on the shore. 
Critical survival sentence: Those jagged rocks on the shore would surely destroy his 
raft. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Rick gasped; he saw his ex-wife standing on the 
jagged rocks. 
Rick didn't want to be anywhere near those rocks. 
The sun was starting to set over the trees in the distance. 
He paddled furiously to move his raft. 
Critical functional sentence: Rick's raft was floating far from the jagged rocks. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Rick's raft was floating close to the jagged rocks. 
Rick wasn't sure what the future held for him. 
He wasn't sure if he could ever go home again. 
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Was Rick floating down the Amazon River? 
Was Rick accused of assault? 
 
Story 7 
It was Saturday morning. 
Erika had just finishing moving across country to California. 
Nothing big was going on today so she slept in. 
After hitting the snooze a few times she finally woke up. 
The most important part of the day was getting some coffee. 
As she headed for the kitchen she walked past her favorite picture - it was a portrait with 
a large custom frame. 
The giant frame weighed more than she did. 
As she walked she noticed something strange. 
Critical survival sentence: Earthquake - she needed to stand away from the heavy 
frame! 
Critical non-survival sentence: The frame seemed crooked; she should stand back 
for a better view. 
She took a deep breath and began to move. 
She had just moved to California hoping things would go well. 
This could be a bad omen. 
Critical functional sentence: Erika was standing away from the frame. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Erika was standing right under the frame. 
She was sad because she had just bought the house. 
She was now regretting the move to California. 
Had Erika moved to California? 
Was the day Saturday? 
 
Story 8 
Tyler loved digging around in an old junkyard - it was one of his favorite pastimes. 
His friends told him that vicious dogs sometimes guarded the place, but Tyler never saw 
one. 
The junkyard was filled with all sorts of stuff. 
There was everything from stuffed animals to construction equipment. 
But it was mostly filled with old beat up cars. 
He could usually find something salvageable. 
Today he needed to find a used part for his car. 
He carefully searched for the small part.  
Critical survival sentence: Tyler saw a big growling dog and had to find higher 
ground. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Tyler had to get a better view from someplace 
higher. 
He looked around to find something to help him out. 
He noticed an old truck in the distance. 
Without hesitating, he ran quickly towards the truck. 
Critical functional sentence: Tyler was standing on top of the old truck. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Tyler was standing right next to the old truck. 
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Just then he heard a loud crashing sound. 
It was the owner - he must be returning from his lunch break. 
Was Tyler looking for a used car part? 
Did Tyler like the junkyard? 
 
Story 9 
Jason was traveling by himself in the arctic. 
The place was so isolated that there was no one in sight. 
All he could see was snow - everything was white. 
It was so cold here in the arctic that all of the water was frozen over. 
On the bright side, though, this made it easier to travel in straight paths. 
Jason paused for a moment to rest. 
He reached in his coat pocket for an energy bar. 
Unfortunately, he didn't have any left. 
Critical survival sentence: It was so cold, he needed to find shelter to survive. 
Critical non-survival sentence: He wondered if anyone still lived in the igloos here. 
He looked around him in every direction. 
Jason saw an igloo on the horizon. 
He quickly made his way to it. 
Critical functional sentence: Jason was squatting inside of the igloo. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Jason was squatting outside of the igloo. 
He was impressed by the small structure. 
He was convinced, though, that he wouldn't want to live here. 
Was the water in the arctic frozen? 
Did Jason see a polar bear? 
 
Story 10 
Robert was hiking in a forest that was very dense with trees. 
The smell of pine filled the air. 
He was amazed at how tall the trees were. 
Some of them had to be hundreds of feet tall. 
He looked to the west and saw that the sun was beginning to set. 
He turned around and couldn't see the path he had taken into the forest. 
To the side, though, was a dark cave. 
Robert decided to check it out and went inside the dark cave. 
Critical survival sentence: As he explored, he heard a bear growling, and was 
frightened. 
Critical non-survival sentence: As he explored, it was getting late and getting 
darker. 
Robert knew he needed to get out of the cave immediately. 
He scrambled back toward the entrance of the cave. 
He stopped for a moment to catch his breath.  
Critical functional sentence: Robert was standing just outside of the cave. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Robert was still standing inside of the cave. 
He wanted his flashlight. 
Unfortunately, he had forgotten to put it in his fanny pack. 
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Was the sun setting? 
Did Robert find his flashlight? 
 
Story 11 
Ivan was hiking in the jungle. 
It was extremely humid this afternoon. 
In fact, Ivan would go so far as to say that the air felt moist. 
It was so humid that Ivan was dripping with sweat all over his body. 
However, despite the weather, he was glad that he took this trip. 
It allowed him to get away from his life, and to forget about his bitter divorce. 
The real world seemed like it didn't matter anymore now that he was in the jungle. 
He stopped for a moment to tie his shoelaces. 
Critical survival sentence: Ivan turned and saw a rabid wolf foaming at the mouth. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Ivan felt really hungry and wanted something to eat. 
Ivan quickly stood up and rubbed his eyes. 
There was a tall fruit tree in his periphery; the branches were far from the ground. 
He jumped up, reaching for the branches. 
Critical functional sentence: Ivan was crouching up in the tall fruit tree.  
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Ivan was crouching next to the tall fruit tree. 
The tree was pretty sturdy. 
It was filled with a whole bunch of ripe mangoes. 
Did the air feel dry? 
Was Ivan divorced? 
 
Story 12 
David walked along the banks of the river. 
It had been raining for weeks so the river was full. 
He really enjoyed the sound of the water. 
He found it to be very peaceful. 
He thought the view of the quiet river was amazing. 
He decided to take some pictures with his new digital camera. 
He wanted to capture the beauty of the river. 
He scanned his surroundings looking for the perfect shot. 
Critical survival sentence: From the corner of his eye he saw an alligator. 
Critical non-survival sentence: From the corner of his eye he saw a tiny turtle. 
He became very silent. 
He didn't want to bring more attention to himself or startle it. 
He started to slowly move away. 
Critical functional sentence: David knelt down behind a very large rock. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: David knelt in front of a very large rock. 
Except for shows on the Discovery Channel, he had never seen one of these before. 
He couldn't wait to tell his friends when he got back home. 
Did David take pictures with his cell phone? 
Did David think the sound of the water was peaceful? 
 
Story 13 
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Jen was doing some yard work on the weekend. 
It was the middle of September and the weather was beautiful. 
She really would like to be swimming, but these chores needed to be done first. 
She preferred to do everything in one weekend, so she could get it over with. 
She didn't mind doing this though. 
At least she didn't have to take care of the cars - her husband took care of those. 
Earlier she had been using a ladder to clean the tall windows on her house. 
Right now she was pulling weeds along the side of the house. 
Critical survival sentence: Jen saw some poisonous black widow spiders on the 
ground. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Jen saw a really small cockroach scurrying across 
the ground. 
She didn't trust her eyes at first. 
When she looked again she started to freak out. 
She wanted to get as far off the ground as possible. 
Critical functional sentence: Jen screamed while she was on top of the ladder. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Jen screamed while she was right next to the 
ladder. 
At that moment she closed her eyes. 
She was trying to calm down by thinking of a happy place. 
Was it September? 
Was Jen's husband taking care of their cars? 
 
Story 14 
Paul had been in Afghanistan for six months. 
This was his second tour overseas. 
Paul was relieved that so far he hadn't seen any real combat. 
Today they were doing a routine patrol in their tank. 
After a couple of hours the guys were bored and hot. 
They stepped out of the tank to cool off and take a break. 
Some of the guys lit up cigarettes. 
Just then Paul spotted some people who appeared on the side of the road. 
Critical survival sentence: It was an ambush and the enemy started shooting. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Another unit needed to be towed behind Paul's tank. 
Paul yelled to his unit as he started to move. 
They all acknowledged his yell right away. 
A couple of the guys followed Paul. 
Critical functional sentence: Paul was standing right behind the armored tank. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Paul was standing in front of the armored tank. 
He realized that he had dropped his gloves. 
He paused for a moment while he pondered whether it was worth it to go get them. 
Did the soldiers light up cigarettes? 
Did Paul drop his gloves? 
 
Story 15 
Mark began every morning with a brisk five mile jog. 
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Although it was chillier outside than usual, he did not mind. 
He preferred the cool air instead of the brutal summer heat. 
If he kept a solid pace, Mark might get back in time for breakfast before work. 
He had almost completed his fourth mile when he turned on Main Street. 
The stores were just beginning to open. 
He waved at a friend sitting across the street at a café. 
Mark turned and started to walk across an intersection. 
Critical survival sentence: A speeding car headed toward him in the intersection. 
Critical non-survival sentence: A skateboarder headed toward him in the 
intersection. 
Mark looked up at the crossing signal. 
The walk signal was still flashing. 
He rushed to get across the intersection. 
Critical functional sentence: Mark walked and had made it across the crosswalk. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Mark walked and was halfway across the 
crosswalk. 
Suddenly Mark began heaving, unable to catch his breath. 
He clutched at his heart and hoped that this wasn't the end of the line. 
Did Mark usually bike in the mornings? 
Was it really hot outside? 
 
Story 16 
Kathy loves being outdoors and is always up for adventure. 
Every month she comes up with something new to try. 
This month she decided to go rock climbing at the Grand Canyon. 
She chose the Grand Canyon because of the breathtaking views. 
Plus she had never had a chance to come to the Grand Canyon. 
She had been rock climbing before, but this time she was alone. 
She knew it was risky but that made it even more exciting. 
As she climbed up the rocks, she surveyed her position. 
Critical survival sentence: Just then, the rope came untied and she had to save 
herself. 
Critical non-survival sentence: She was happy because she was close to reaching the 
top. 
Her adrenaline was rushing. 
It took all of her energy but she held on tightly to the rope. 
She knew all she had to do was grab the next rock. 
Critical functional sentence: She was able to reach the rock above her. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: She was far away from the rock above her. 
It was an adventure she would never forget. 
She couldn't wait to see what her next challenge would be. 
Was Kathy at Red Rock? 
Was Kathy mountain biking? 
 
Story 17 
Today was day three. 
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Every year Dan liked to get away to the woods with his wife. 
This year was no exception. 
They loved to spend a week in the summer, away from the heat back home. 
The temperature was at least twenty degrees cooler here. 
Plus, it was nice to get away from their email and phones for a while. 
Right now his wife was out looking at birds. 
Meanwhile Dan stayed back at the camp because he wanted something to eat. 
Critical survival sentence: Dan saw a cobra emerge that looked like it might attack. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Dan was hungry and wanted to eat the steak that he 
cooked. 
Dan quickly looked around. 
He needed to find his bowie knife. 
Thankfully he found it quickly and picked it up. 
Critical functional sentence: Dan held his bowie knife out in front of him. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Dan held his bowie knife down along his side. 
He was glad that he brought his knife with him. 
If it wasn't for his wife, he would have forgotten to bring it. 
Was it cooler in the woods? 
Was Dan's wife looking at birds? 
 
Story 18 
It was Jim's twenty-fifth birthday. 
He woke up eager to celebrate. 
Unfortunately, he had to go to work that day. 
When he got to his office, he went to the top floor to say good morning to his friend, Dot. 
Dot wished him a happy birthday and gave him a plate of cookies. 
She had made the cookies from scratch just for him. 
Dot told Jim that they were chocolate chip cookies. 
Jim grabbed one and took a really big bite. 
Critical survival sentence: Suddenly Jim's throat began to tighten; he was choking. 
Critical non-survival sentence: Jim wanted to thank Dot, but his mouth was full of 
cookie. 
He stopped chewing and tried to swallow. 
His throat felt dry and scratchy -– he needed to drink some water. 
He walked around and saw a drinking fountain. 
Critical functional sentence: The drinking fountain was right in front of him. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: The drinking fountain was down the hall from him. 
Jim began to cough. 
Dot thought that Jim was disgusting and gross. 
Was it Jim's fortieth birthday? 
Did Dot make brownies for Jim? 
 
Story 19 
Every summer Chip visited his uncle on the family ranch. 
His uncle always made him work hard. 
He said that a boy like Chip would do good if he developed a good work ethic. 
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Chip thought that his uncle was old fashioned. 
He'd rather be back at the house playing PS3 instead. 
But, he knew his uncle wouldn't let him have dinner unless he finished the chores. 
Today Chip was cleaning up and inspecting the fence and gate around the cattle. 
Chip didn't care for this because the cattle could sometimes act unpredictably. 
Critical survival sentence: Suddenly there was a stampede - he had to get up high. 
Critical non-survival sentence: The top of the gate was dirty and needed to be 
cleaned. 
Chip wanted to move quickly. 
There was barbed wire along the fence, but none on the gate. 
The gate was very tall - at least two feet higher than the fence. 
Critical functional sentence: Chip climbed up so he was on top of the gate. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Chip moved so that he was right next to the gate. 
The cattle were very loud and aggressive. 
Chip hated working on this ranch. 
Did Chip's uncle make him work hard? 
Did Chip like working at the ranch? 
 
Story 20 
Tim was at the zoo. 
It was his favorite place to go on his days off from work. 
Today was a beautiful day. 
Some of the animals were out sunning themselves. 
Tim walked towards the lion’s den. 
While one lion was out in the open eating its food it looked up and growled at him. 
Tim wanted to see what the lion was eating. 
He leaned over the railing to get a better look. 
Critical survival sentence: Tim lost his balance and fell in near the hungry lion. 
Critical non-survival sentence: He saw that the lion was eating a piece of raw meat. 
A wave of nausea swept over Tim. 
He knew that he needed to get out of there. 
He saw an exit sign. 
Critical functional sentence: Tim was standing right next to the main exit. 
Critical nonfunctional sentence: Tim was standing far away from the exit. 
His face was dripping with sweat. 
This was not a good day. 
Were the animals swimming? 
Did a lion growl? 
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APPENDIX II 
RECOGNITION ITEMS 
Story 1 
Earl was holding the plastic tarp above him. 
Earl was holding the plastic tarp next to him. 
Earl was holding the newspaper above him. 
Earl was holding the newspaper next to him. 
 
Story 2 
Kim moved and was standing next to the campfire. 
Kim moved and was standing far from the campfire. 
Kim moved and was standing next to the backpack. 
Kim moved and was standing far from the backpack. 
 
Story 3 
Ted was crouching quietly inside the cave. 
Ted was crouching quietly outside the cave. 
Ted was crouching quietly inside the boat. 
Ted was crouching quietly outside the boat. 
 
Story 4 
Izzie was holding her gun in front of her.  
Izzie was holding her gun down at her side. 
Izzie was holding her compass in front of her.  
Izzie was holding her compass down at her side. 
 
Story 5 
Beth took a breath as she stood in the water. 
Beth took a breath as she stood near the water. 
Beth took a breath as she stood in the leaves. 
Beth took a breath as she stood near the leaves. 
 
Story 6 
Rick's raft was floating far from the jagged rocks. 
Rick's raft was floating close to the jagged rocks. 
Rick's raft was floating far from the waterfall. 
Rick's raft was floating close to the waterfall. 
 
Story 7 
Erika was standing away from the frame. 
Erika was standing right under the frame 
Erika was standing away from the clock. 
Erika was standing right under the clock. 
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Story 8 
Tyler was standing on top of the old truck. 
Tyler was standing right next to the old truck. 
Tyler was standing on top of the old stove. 
Tyler was standing right next to the old stove. 
 
Story 9 
Jason was squatting inside of the igloo. 
Jason was squatting outside of the igloo. 
Jason was squatting inside of the snow bank. 
Jason was squatting outside of the snow bank. 
 
Story 10 
Robert was standing just outside of the cave. 
Robert was still standing inside of the cave. 
Robert was standing just outside of the lodge. 
Robert was still standing inside of the lodge. 
 
Story 11 
Ivan was crouching up in the tall fruit tree.  
Ivan was crouching next to the tall fruit tree. 
Ivan was standing up in the dense weeds. 
Ivan was standing next to the dense weeds. 
 
Story 12 
David knelt down behind a very large rock. 
David knelt in front of a very large rock. 
David knelt down behind a very large tree stump. 
David knelt in front of a very large tree stump. 
 
Story 13 
Jen screamed while she was on top of the ladder. 
Jen screamed while she was right next to the ladder. 
Jen screamed while she was on top of the table. 
Jen screamed while she was right next to the table. 
 
Story 14 
Paul was standing right behind the armored tank. 
Paul was standing in front of the armored tank. 
Paul was standing right behind the old jeep. 
Paul was standing in front of the old jeep. 
 
Story 15 
Mark walked and had made it across the crosswalk. 
Mark walked and was halfway across the crosswalk. 
Mark walked and had made it across the bridge. 
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Mark walked and was halfway across the bridge. 
 
Story 16 
She was able to reach the rock above her. 
She was far away from the rock above her. 
She was able to reach the tree branch above her. 
She was far away from the tree branch above her. 
 
Story 17 
Dan held his bowie knife out in front of him. 
Dan held his bowie knife down along his side. 
Dan held his fishing rod out in front of him. 
Dan held his fishing rod down along his side. 
 
Story 18 
The drinking fountain was right in front of him. 
The drinking fountain was down the hall from him. 
The copy machine was right in front of him. 
The copy machine was down the hall from him. 
 
Story 19 
Chip climbed up so he was on top of the gate. 
Chip moved so that he was right next to the gate. 
Chip climbed up so he was on top of the horse. 
Chip moved so that he was right next to the horse. 
 
Story 20 
Tim was standing right next to the main exit. 
Tim was standing far away from the exit. 
Tim was standing right next to the zoo gift shop. 
Tim was standing far away from the gift shop. 
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APPENDIX III 
PREDICTED READING TIME OUTCOMES 
 
Figure 1. Possible reading time outcome where effects of survival and functionality are 
additive. 
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Figure 2. Possible reading time outcome where reading times are faster if sentences are 
either survival or functional (or both). 
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Figure 3. Possible reading time outcome if survival drives the functionality effect. 
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Figure 4. Possible reading time outcome where reading times are faster if sentences are 
functional. 
. 
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APPENDIX IV 
PREDICTED RECOGNITION OUTCOMES 
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Figure 5. Possible accuracy outcome if effects of survival and functionality are additive. 
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Figure 6. Possible accuracy outcome if high accuracy requires situation to either be 
survival or functional (or both). 
Figure 7. Possible accuracy outcome if Survival drives the Functionality effect. 
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Figure 8. Possible accuracy outcome if high accuracy requires situation to be functional 
only. 
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APPENDIX V 
STORY ACCEPTABILITY JUDGMENTS 
 
Story condition M SE 
Survival-functional 5.34 .08 
Survival-nonfunctional 5.19 .10 
Non-survival-functional 5.24 .11 
Non-survival-nonfunctional 5.15 .08 
 
 
Table 1. Story readability judgements. 
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Sentence as possible fit (yes/no) Sentence fit ratings 
 Surv Non-surv Surv Non-surv 
Functional 9.50 (.40) 9.40 (.31) 6.03 (.33) 5.98 (.23) 
Nonfunctional 9.30 ( .21) 9.20 (.33) 4.76 (.27) 5.14 (.27) 
Distracter 4.60 (.73) 4.30 (.78) 2.11 (.09) 2.12 (.21) 
 
 
Table 2. Means and standard errors for the critical spatial relations sentence acceptability 
judgments and ratings. 
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Comparison Wilcoxon signed 
ranks test (Z) 
p 
Non-survival-functional vs. survival-functional -.45 .66 
Survival-nonfunctional vs. survival-functional -.69 .49 
Non-survival-nonfunctional vs. survival-functional -1.00 .32 
Survival-nonfunctional vs. non-survival-nonfunctional -.33 .74 
Non-survival-nonfunctional vs. non-survival-functional -1.00 .32 
Non-survival-nonfunctional vs. survival-nonfunctional -.33 .74 
Distracter 1 vs. survival-functional -2.68 .007 
Distracter 1vs. non-survival-functional -2.67 .008 
Distracter 1 vs. survival-nonfunctional -2.68 .007 
Distracter 1 vs. non-survival-nonfunctional -2.67 .008 
Distracter 2 vs. survival-functional -2.68 .007 
Distracter 2 vs. non-survival-functional -2.67 .008 
Distracter 2 vs. survival-non-functional -2.67 .008 
Distracter 2 vs. non-survival-nonfunctional -2.69 .007 
Distracter 2 vs. distracter 1 -7.82 .43 
 
 
Table 3. Sentence acceptability judgments. 
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APPENDIX VI 
RECOGNITION OUTCOME TABLE 
 
 Survival Non-survival 
Functional .80 (.24) .82 (.23) 
Nonfunctional .66 (.25) .75 (.23) 
 
 
Table 4. Means and standard errors for recognition scores. 
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APPENDIX VII 
RECOGNITION OUTCOME FIGURES 
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Figure 9. Effect of functionality on recognition scores. 
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Figure 10. Effect of survival on recognition scores. 
Figure 11. Interactive effects of functionality and survival on recognition scores. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
READING TIME TABLE 
 
 Survival Non-survival 
Functional 2085.02 (753.50) 2209.44 (721.60) 
Nonfunctional 2369.99 (960.31) 2182.44 (701.07) 
 
 
Table 5. Means and standard errors for critical sentence reading times. 
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APPENDIX IX 
READING TIME OUTCOME FIGURES 
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Figure 12. Effect of functionality on critical sentence reading times. 
86 
0.00
500.00
1000.00
1500.00
2000.00
2500.00
Survival Non-survival
R
T 
(m
se
cs
)
 
 
0.00
500.00
1000.00
1500.00
2000.00
2500.00
3000.00
Survival Non-survival
R
T 
(m
se
cs
)
Functional
Nonfuntional
 
Figure 13. Effect of survival on critical sentence reading times. 
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Figure 14. Interactive effects of functionality and survival on critical sentence reading 
times. 
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APPENDIX X 
IRB APPROVAL FORM 
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